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FOUNDATIONS FOR OPTIMAL INATTENTION
ANDREW ELLIS
(JOB MARKET PAPER)
Abstract. This paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to
information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information.
An optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by constrained
maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation. The main
result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are
necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention.
Observing these choices permits unique identification of the agent’s utility index, cognitive
constraint and prior (the last under a suitable richness condition). An application considers
a market in which strategic firms offer differentiated products. If the consumer’s information
concerns firms’ quality, then equilibrium consumer surplus may be higher with an optimally
inattentive consumer than with one who processes all available information.
1. Introduction
1.1. Objectives and Outline. Individuals often appear not to process all available in-
formation. This phenomenon, documented in both psychology and economics,1 is usually
attributed to agents’ limited capacity to pay attention to information (Sims [2003]). When
the available information exceeds their capacity, agents exhibit inattention, i.e. condition
their choices on coarser information. This inattentiveness has significant economic conse-
quences.2
This paper models agents who respond optimally to their limited attention. An optimally
inattentive agent has a constraint that limits the information to which she can pay attention,
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documented that agents, e.g. restaurant patrons (Luca [2011]), stock traders (DellaVigna and Pollet [2009])
and professional forecasters (Coibion and Gorodnichenko [2011a,b]), fail to process all available information.
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and she chooses both her coarsening and her actions (or acts) conditional on that coarsening
by maximizing a subjective expected utility preference relation. I axiomatically characterize
the conditional choices of actions (acts) by a decision maker (DM) that are necessary and
sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention. These
axioms clarify the model’s implications for choice behavior and provide a choice-theoretic
justification for it.
The modeler observes an objective state space and a partition describing the objective
information. In contrast, the DM’s tastes, her prior beliefs, her capacity for attention,
and the information to which she pays attention (which I call her subjective information to
distinguish it from the finer, objective information) are taken to be unobservables that must
be inferred from choices. I assume a rich set of choice data, namely the DM’s choices from
each feasible set of acts and conditional on each state of the world.3
The rationale for assuming that the indicated range of behavior is observable is easily
understood. First, with a narrower range of behavior, the model cannot be characterized.
Choice out of a single feasible set cannot reveal much about underlying behavior for the rea-
sons familiar from standard choice theory. Furthermore when the state space is unobservable
and choice is observed conditional on a single state, earlier work by Van Zandt [1996] shows
that optimal inattention has no testable implications.4,5 Second, my setting allows analysis
directly in terms of the economic object of interest – namely, the agent’s chosen action, such
as setting a price, selecting a bundle of goods, or deciding from which firm to purchase. Fi-
nally, this range of behavior permits unique identification of the unobservables, even though
the DM’s choices violate many of the well-understood properties that permit identification
in other models, including the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next subsection, I use an example
to illustrate my setting, the behavior of interest and how I achieve identification. Section
2 presents the model in detail. In Section 3, I formally describe the behavior of interest
through five axioms. Theorems 1 and 2 show that these axioms characterize an optimally
3This data is an extension of that considered by the papers cited in Footnote 2, which study all conditional
choices from a single feasible set. It is easily obtainable in a laboratory environment, and it could, in
principle, be gathered from a real-world setting where both the realized state and the information received
by the agent are independently and identically distributed across time.
4Van Zandt [1996] studies hidden information acquisition, which is readily reinterpreted as optimal inatten-
tion. Specifically, he takes as given any choice correspondence on a finite collection of alternatives. He shows
that one can construct a state space and an information acquisition problem so that for every choice problem,
the alternative selected in a fixed state matches the choice correspondence if the DM chooses information
optimally.
5The model’s implications when the state space and choice conditional on only one state are observable an
open question. A partial answer is given by the axioms Monotonicity and ACI (below): conditional choices
in a fixed state satisfy WARP when the problem contains only state-independent acts. However, they violate
WARP (as well as many weaker properties implied by it) in general, and although identification of the utility
index is possible, the attention constraint cannot be identified.
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inattentive DM’s choices. I also characterize two special cases: a DM who processes all
information and a DM who processes the same information, regardless of the menu faced.
In Section 4, Theorem 3 shows that the utility index, the attention constraint and, in many
circumstances, the prior are uniquely identified by the agent’s conditional choices.
In Section 5, Theorem 4 gives an intuitive, behavioral comparison equivalent to one opti-
mally inattentive DM having a higher capacity for attention than another. I then argue that
an optimally inattentive DM values information differently than a Bayesian DM because
the former may not process all available information. Even if one information partition is
objectively more valuable than another (in the sense of Blackwell [1953]), it may not be
subjectively more valuable. That is, because of information overload a DM may reject an
objectively more valuable information partition in favor of a coarser one. After generalizing
my setting to allow the objective information to vary, Theorem 5 characterizes the subjective
value of information to an optimally inattentive DM in terms of her choices.
In Section 6, I analyze a market where firms compete over optimally inattentive consumers.
Intuition suggests that firms can exploit these consumers, and previous work (cf. Rubinstein
[1993]) focuses on that aspect. Fixing prices, consumer surplus increases as capacity for
attention increases. However, if strategic effects are taken into account, then lower consumer
capacity for attention may lead to higher equilibrium consumer surplus. In fact, firms may
benefit from facing more attentive consumers. The key difference from earlier work is that
consumers perceive the price perfectly, but they are inattentive to information about the
quality of the products. Intuitively, if consumers allocate their attention optimally, then a
firm attracts attention only if it offers the consumer more surplus. This induces competition
among firms who would not otherwise compete, which lowers prices and increases consumer
surplus.
Section 7 concludes by discussing the relationship with other models of inattention. Proofs
are collected in appendices.
1.2. Example. Consider a benevolent doctor who treats patients suffering from a given
disease. Glaxo, Merck, and Pfizer all produce pharmaceuticals that treat the disease, but
the doctor knows that one of the three drugs will be strictly more effective than the other
two. The one that works best for each patient is initially unknown, and the doctor can,
in principle, determine it; for instance, by constructing a very detailed medical history.
Uncertainty is modeled by the state space Ω = {γ, µ, φ}, and the objective information by
the partition
P = {{γ}, {µ}, {φ}}.
The state indicates whether the most effective drug is produced by Glaxo (γ), by Merck (µ)
or by Pfizer (φ), and P indicates that the doctor can determine which state obtains.
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Table 1. Conditional choices
γ µ φ
c({g,m, f}|·) {m} {m} {f}
c({g,m}|·) {g} {m} {m}
Suppose there are two patients who are identical except that they have different insurance
plans: one’s covers all three drugs, and the other’s does not cover Pfizer’s drug. Each patient
is a choice problem, in which prescribing a drug corresponds to choosing an act (g, m and f
represent prescribing the drugs produced by Glaxo, Merck and Pfizer respectively). The drug
prescribed to each patient conditional on each state of the world is given by a conditional
choice correspondence, a family of choice correspondences indexed by the state of the world.
Table 1 lists the conditional choices of a doctor when facing {g,m, f} (the problem associated
with unrestricted insurance) and {g,m} (the problem associated with restricted insurance).
Under the assumption that the doctor’s choices result from optimal inattention, what
can be inferred from them? One complication is that the doctor’s choices violate WARP
in state γ: she chooses g but not m from {g,m} and chooses m but not g from {g,m, f}.
Although WARP violations prevent identification of preference through the usual methods,
the doctor’s tastes, subjective information, and attention constraint can nevertheless be
inferred from her choices. To begin with, the above choices reveal that the doctor cannot
pay attention to all the objective information. If she did, then her choice when Glaxo’s drug
is effective from the first menu would reveal that she strictly prefers to prescribe it rather
than to prescribe Merck’s drug. Therefore, if Glaxo’s drug is available in the larger problem
and it is the most effective, then she should not prescribe Merck’s. But because she chooses
to prescribe the latter when facing {g,m, f} in state γ, she does not pay attention to the
objective information.
Since the doctor does not pay attention to the objective information, I turn to inferring
her subjective information, i.e. the information to which she does pay attention. When
facing {g,m}, she chooses differently conditional on γ than she does conditional on either
µ or φ, so her subjective information must be at least as fine as {{γ}, {µ, φ}}. Moreover, it
cannot be strictly finer because it would then be the objective information. Consequently, her
subjective information is exactly {{γ}, {µ, φ}} when facing {g,m}. Similarly, her subjective
information must be {{φ}, {γ, µ}} when facing {g,m, f}. Therefore, the doctor chooses
as if she knows the answer to the question “Is Glaxo’s drug the most effective?” when
facing {g,m} and “Is Pfizer’s drug the most effective?” when facing {g,m, f}. With her
subjective information known, her choices reveal her conditional preferences, which can then
be aggregated to reveal her underlying unconditional preferences.
How can one tell if the doctor’s choices have an optimal inattention representation? The-
orems 1 and 2 show that a set of properties characterizes a doctor whose choices can be
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seen as if they result from optimal inattention. The doctor’s choices do not violate any
of these properties, so they are compatible with optimal inattention. However, consider a
second doctor who chooses according to c′(·), where c′(·) is the same same as c(·) except
c′({g,m, f}|φ) = {m}. Although both doctors select the same prescription from each choice
problem in state γ, when the other conditional choices are considered, c′(·) cannot have an
optimal inattention representation. To see this, note that the second doctor chooses Merck’s
drug when the patient has good insurance, regardless of the state of the world. As above, the
modeler infers that the doctor knows whether Glaxo’s drug is the most effective when facing
{g,m}, so her choice of g in state γ reveals that she strictly prefers prescribing it to prescrib-
ing Merck’s in that state. However, this implies that her choices from the smaller problem
yield a better outcome in every state of the world than those from the larger problem, an
impossibility if her subjective information is optimal when facing both problems.
2. Setup and Model
2.1. Setup. I adopt the following version of the classic Anscombe-Aumann setting. Un-
certainty is captured by a set of states Ω and a set of events Σ, a σ−algebra of subsets
of Ω. Consequences are elements of a separable metric space, Z. Let the set X consist of
all finite-support probability measures on Z, endowed with the weak* topology. Objects of
choice are acts, Σ−measurable simple (finite-ranged) functions f : Ω → X. Let F be the
set of all acts, endowed with the topology of uniform convergence. Since F is metrizable, let
d(·) be a compatible metric.6
The DM must choose an act from a compact set, i.e. her choice problem is a non-empty,
compact subset of F . LetK(F) be the set of all choice problems, endowed with the Hausdorff
topology generated by the metric d(·). She has access to objective information, represented
by P , a finite partition of Ω.7 I require every element of the partition be an element of Σ.
Knowing the objective information allows the modeler to distinguish imperfect information
from limited capacity for attention.8
Choice results from a three-stage process. In stage 1, the state is realized but remains
unknown to the DM. In stage 2, the DM chooses an act. Although in principle she observes
the realized cell of P before making this choice, she instead acts as if she observes the realized
cell of her subjective information. In stage 3, all uncertainty is resolved and the DM gets the
6X is metrizable by Theorem 15.12 of Aliprantis and Border [2006]. Let dˆ : X ×X → R+ be a compatible
metric. Since F has the topology of uniform convergence, fn → f ⇐⇒ supω dˆ(fn(ω), f(ω))→ 0. Therefore
d : F × F → R+ given by d(f, g) = supω dˆ(f(ω), g(ω)) is a compatible metric on F ; since F contains only
simple acts, the supremum is attained and d(f, g) <∞ for any f, g ∈ F .
7With minor additional assumptions, P can be taken to be countable rather than finite.
8Because the modeler knows the objectively available information, inattention can be distinguished from
imperfect information. For instance, if the modeler observes that the DM never distinguishes between states
ω1 and ω2, then this is interpreted as inattention only if the objective information distinguishes ω1 from ω2.
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Figure 1. Timeline
{Ω}
E1
E2
E3
{Ω}
E1
E2
E3
vs.
Objective information set Subjective information set
consequence specified by her chosen act and the realized state. The tree on the left in Figure
1 illustrates the timing. If the DM exhibits inattention, she acts as if facing a different tree
than the objective one; for instance, the one on the right in Figure 1.
The modeler observes the DM’s choices in stage 2 (or later) and the realization of the
objective information, but does not observe the DM’s subjective information. The choice
data generates a conditional choice correspondence c(·), such that the DM is willing to choose
the acts in c(B|ω) from the problem B when the state is ω. Formally, this is a set-valued,
P -measurable function c : K(F) × Ω → K(F) with c(B|ω) ⊂ B for all B ∈ K(F) and all
ω ∈ Ω.
I adopt the following notation throughout. Identify X with the subset of acts that do not
depend on the state, i.e. x ∈ X corresponds to the act x ∈ F such that x(ω) = x ∀ω ∈ Ω,
and let K(X) be the set of compact, non-empty subsets of X, noting that K(X) ⊂ K(F).
For any partitions Q and Q′, write Q Q′ if Q is finer than Q′. For any acts f, g ∈ F and
any event E ∈ Σ, define fEg to be the act that yields f(ω) if ω ∈ E and g(ω) if ω /∈ E. For
any α ∈ [0, 1] and any two f, g ∈ F let αf +(1−α)g ∈ F be the state-wise mixture of f and
g, or the act taking the value in state ω of αf(ω)+(1−α)g(ω), defined by the usual mixture
operation on lotteries. For any A,B ∈ K(F) and α ∈ [0, 1], let αA + (1− α)B ∈ K(F) be
{αa+ (1−α)b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. Any act in αA+ (1−α)B is an α mixture of an act in A with
a (1− α) mixture of an act in B.
2.2. Model. An optimally inattentive agent is a tuple (u(·), pi(·),P∗, Pˆ (·)), where:
• u : X → R is continuous and affine,
• pi : Σ→ [0, 1] is finitely-additive and pi(E) > 0 for every E ∈ P ,
• P∗ ⊂ {Q : P  Q} has the property that if Q ∈ P∗ and Q Q′, then Q′ ∈ P∗, and
• Pˆ : K(F)→ P∗.
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The utility index u(·) and prior pi(·) have familiar interpretations. Neither varies with the
problem, so an optimally inattentive DM has stable tastes and beliefs. I focus on interpreting
the two new objects, the attention constraint P∗ and the attention rule Pˆ (·). The former
describes to what the DM can pay attention, while the latter describes to what she does pay
attention. The attention constraint P∗ is a set of partitions, all of which are coarser than
the objective information. If Q ∈ P∗, then the DM has the capacity to pay attention to Q.
I assume that P∗ satisfies free disposal of information, in the sense that whenever she can
pay attention Q, she can also pay attention to any Q′ that is coarser than Q. Depending on
the problem, the DM may have different subjective information, given by the attention rule
Pˆ (·). That is, Pˆ (B) is her subjective information when facing the problem B.
Definition 1. A conditional choice correspondence c(·) has an optimal inattention repre-
sentation if there exists an optimally inattentive agent so that for every problem B,
(1) Pˆ (B) ∈ arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E)],
and for every problem B and state ω,
(2) c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)).
The DM’s choices have an optimal inattention representation if they satisfy two properties.
Equation (1) requires that her subjective information gives at least as high expected utility
as any other partition in P∗, i.e. it is chosen optimally. Equation (2) requires that the DM’s
choice from B in state ω maximizes expected utility conditional on the realized cell of her
subjective information.
An optimally inattentive DM considers all available acts. In contrast, Masatlioglu et al.
[2012] studies an agent who does not pay attention to the entire set of available actions.
Although both models are motivated by the same underlying mechanism, neither nests the
other: there are choices compatible with optimal inattention but not inattention to alter-
natives and vice versa.9 While DMs conforming to either model may violate WARP, the
reason for such violations is different.10 In fact, an optimally inattentive DM may exhibit
inattention yet satisfy WARP (Corollary 2).
One special case of optimal inattention is a DM who processes all available information.
I call such a DM Bayesian, and say that c(·) has a Bayesian representation if
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|P (ω))
9See Appendix C.6 and C.7.
10In Masatlioglu et al. [2012], removing unchosen alternatives may affect the options considered by the DM;
in this paper, removing alternatives not chosen in a given state may alter the information processed.
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for every B and ω. In the model, this corresponds to an optimally inattentive agent with
P∗ = {Q : Q P} and Pˆ (B) = P for every problem B.
Another special case is a DM who always pay attention to the same information (which
may differ from the objective information), regardless of the problem faced. I say that such a
DM has fixed attention, and that c(·) has fixed attention representation if there is a partition
Q satisfying P  Q so that
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
for every B and ω. In the model, this corresponds to an optimally inattentive agent with
P∗ = {Q′ : Q′  Q} and Pˆ (B) = Q for every problem B.
In addition to the above special cases, the model admits many others considered in the
literature. For instance, P∗ could equal the set of all partitions that are both coarser than
P and have at most κ ≥ 1 elements (Gul et al. [2011]). Alternatively, P∗ could equal the set
of all partitions that have mutual information with respect to P less than κ (similar to Sims
[2003]).11
3. Foundations
3.1. Axioms. I impose the following axioms. The quantifier “for all f, g ∈ F , A,B ∈ K(F),
ω ∈ Ω and α ∈ (0, 1]” is suppressed throughout.
A DM satisfies WARP, sometimes referred to as Independence of Irrelevant Acts, if for
any A ⊂ B, whenever c(B|ω)∩A 6= ∅ it follows that c(A|ω) = c(B|ω)∩A. If an inattentive
DM’s choices from problems A and B are conditioned on the same subjective information,
then her choice in each state maximizes the same conditional preference relation, so these
choices do not violate WARP. Therefore, if she violates it, then her choices from A and B
must be conditioned on different subjective information. The first axiom, Independence of
Never Relevant Acts or INRA, gives one situation where the DM should not violate WARP.
Axiom 1. (INRA) If A ⊂ B and c(B|ω′) ∩ A 6= ∅ for every state ω′, then
c(A|ω) = c(B|ω) ∩ A.
Within the context of Section 1.2, INRA says that if two patients differ only in that one’s
plan drops the drug h but the doctor never prescribes h to the patient with better insurance,
then she prescribes the same drug to both patients. To interpret the axiom, consider a
problem B and a “never relevant” act f (i.e. f /∈ c(B|ω′) for all ω′), and let A = B\{f}.12
Suppose that her choices from B are conditioned on the subjective information Q. Because
11The mutual information is a measure of the information provided about the realization of one random
variable by another. It corresponds to the reduction in entropy and is used by the rational inattention
literature.
12Whenever B is finite, INRA is equivalent to “if c(B|ω′) 6= {f} for all ω′, then c(B|ω)\{f} = c(B\{f}|ω).”
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she never chooses f from B, the benefit of paying attention to Q when facing A is the
same as it is when facing B. If Q is optimal when facing B, then Q is still optimal when
facing A. Therefore, the DM should have the same subjective information when facing B
as when facing A, so her choices from A and B should not violate WARP. More generally,
the statement c(B|ω′) ∩ A 6= ∅ for every state ω′ implies that the entire set of acts that are
in B but not in A is “never relevant” and removing them would not decrease the benefit of
her subjective information when facing B. As above, if her subjective information is optimal
when facing B, then it is still optimal when facing A. Consequently, the DM’s choices should
not violate WARP.13
In the present context, a DM satisfies Independence if
f ∈ c(A|ω) and g ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ αf + (1− α)g ∈ c(αA+ (1− α)B|ω).
That is, if the DM chooses f over each h in A and g over each h′ in B, then she chooses
αf + (1− α)g over each αh+ (1− α)h′ in αA+ (1− α)B.14 If an optimally inattentive DM
pays attention to the same information when facing the problems A, B and αA+ (1− α)B,
then her choice in each state maximizes the same conditional preference relation. Because
her conditional preferences are expected utility, her choices do not violate Independence.
This implies that whenever the DM violates this property for A, B and αA + (1 − α)B,
she must not pay attention to the same information when facing all three problems. The
second axiom, Attention Constrained Independence or ACI, gives one situation where the
DM should not violate Independence.
Axiom 2. (ACI) f ∈ c(B|ω) if and only if αf + (1− α)g ∈ c(αB + (1− α){g}|ω).
In my example, this says that if there is a state-independent chance that the patient
will take some drug h regardless of what the doctor actually prescribes, then her choice of
prescription is unaffected by both the identity of h and the magnitude of that chance. To
interpret the axiom, fix problems B and {g}. Because {g} is a singleton, the DM makes the
same choice from it no matter what her subjective information is. Therefore, the relationship
between the benefits of any two subjective information partitions is the same for the problem
B as it is for the problem αB+(1−α){g}.15 If paying attention to Q is optimal when facing
13INRA can be illustrated by the choices in the introduction. Let A = {g,m} and B = {g,m, f}. The doctor
does not violate the axiom because she chooses only f when facing {g,m, f} in state φ, i.e. c(B|φ) ∩ A =
∅. The second doctor, whose choices are represented by c′(·) and who cannot be represented as optimal
inattention, violates the axiom because she never chooses f when facing {g,m, f}, regardless of the state of
the world, i.e. m ∈ A and c(B|ω) = {m} for any ω ∈ {γ, µ, φ} but c(A|γ) 6= c(B|γ) ∩A.
14This follows from the standard formulation of Independence for a binary relation: f  g ⇐⇒ αf + (1−
α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
15One can think of αB + (1− α){g} as flipping a (possibly biased) coin, choosing from B if the coin comes
up heads and otherwise choosing from {g}, where the DM must choose her subjective information before
observing the outcome of the coin-flip. Since information only has value if the coin comes up heads, a
partition is optimal when facing αB + (1− α){g} if and only if it would be optimal when facing B for sure.
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B, then paying attention to Q is also optimal when facing αB + (1− α){g}. Consequently,
an optimally inattentive DM conditions her choices on the same subjective information when
facing αB+(1−α){g} as she does when facing B. Because her conditional preferences satisfy
Independence, she chooses the mixture of her choices from B with g from αB + (1− α){g}.
The next axiom adapts the standard Monotonicity axiom to the present setting. It also
implies that tastes are state independent. For any lotteries x and y, say that x is revealed
(resp. strictly) preferred to y if x ∈ c({x, y}|ω) (resp. and y /∈ c({x, y}|ω)) for some ω.16
Axiom 3. (Monotonicity) (i) If A ∈ K(X), then c(A|ω) = c(A|ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Ω.
(ii) If f, g ∈ B and f(ω′) is revealed preferred to g(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ Ω, then g ∈ c(B|ω) =⇒
f ∈ c(B|ω). Moreover, if f(ω′) is revealed strictly preferred to g(ω′) for each ω′ ∈ P (ω),
then g /∈ c(B|ω).
In my example, this says that the doctor cares only about the realized consequence of
her choice, and if one drug gives a better consequence in every state than another, then she
never prescribes the inferior drug. For interpretation, consider B = {x, y} where x and y
are lotteries. If the DM’s tastes are state independent and she chooses x over y in state
ω, then she also chooses x over y in state ω′. This reveals that the DM prefers x to y, i.e.
considers x to be a better consequence than y. Now, consider acts f and g so that f yields a
better consequence than g in every state of the world. Even if the DM received information
revealing that the state on which g gives the best consequence would occur for sure, she
would still be willing to choose f over g. Consequently, she never chooses only g when f
is available. In addition, if f yields a strictly better consequence than g in every state in
P (ω), then the DM does not choose g. Thus, Monotonicity limits the scope of inattention;
an inattentive DM will never pick a dominated act.
Another common property satisfied by most models of choice under uncertainty is Conse-
quentialism: if f, g ∈ B and f(ω′) = g(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ P (ω), then
f ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ g ∈ c(B|ω).
A DM who satisfies Consequentialism respects the objective information, in the sense that
whenever two acts give the same outcome on every objectively possible state, then one of
the acts is chosen if and only if the other is. A DM whose subjective information differs from
the objective information will violate this property. The next axiom, Subjective Consequen-
tialism, weakens Consequentialism to take this into account.
Axiom 4. (Subjective Consequentialism) If f, g ∈ B and ∀ω′[f(ω′) 6= g(ω′) =⇒ c(B|ω′) 6=
c(B|ω)], then f ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ g ∈ c(B|ω).
16Recall that K(X) is the set of problems that contain only lotteries.
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Subjective Consequentialism implies that choice between any two acts is unaffected by
their outcomes in states that the DM knows did not occur. To see this, fix B, f , and
g as above, and suppose that the DM faces the problem B and that the realized state
is ω. Whenever ω and ω′ are in the same cell of her subjective information when facing
B, the DM’s choices in those states maximize the same conditional preference relation, so
c(B|ω) = c(B|ω′). Consequently, if c(B|ω′) 6= c(B|ω), i.e. the DM makes different choices in
states ω and ω′, then these two states must be in different cells of her subjective information.
By hypothesis, if f and g give a different consequence in state ω′, then c(B|ω′) 6= c(B|ω), so
the DM must know that ω′ did not occur. Therefore, the DM knows that she receives the
same consequenence from choosing either f or g, so she chooses f if and only if she chooses
g.17
My final axiom is a technical condition ensuring the continuity of the underlying preference
relation. Complicating its statement is that the DM’s choices from different menus may be
conditioned on different information. Consequently, her choices may appear discontinuous to
the modeler, and the axiom must take into account that the underlying preference is revealed
by choices that are not conditioned on the same subjective information. To state the axiom,
I need two preliminary definitions. First, say that f dominates g if f is chosen from {f, g} in
every state of the world. If the DM has optimal inattention and f dominates g, then f must
be (weakly) preferred to g conditional on every cell of every feasible subjective information
partition. The second definition is:
Definition 2. The acts in A are indirectly selected over the acts in B, written A IS B,
if there are problems B1, ..., Bn ∈ K(F) so that B1 = A and Bn = B and for each i ∈
{1, ..., n− 1} and every ω, c(Bi+1|ω) ∩Bi 6= ∅.
Suppose that the DM faces B and chooses an act in A regardless of the state of the world.
Since her choices from B are available in A, her set of choices from A is selected over her
choices from B. Moreover, if she chooses an act from B in every state of the world when
facing C, then her set of choices from B is selected over any choices in C. Since the acts in
A are selected over the acts in B that are in turn selected over the acts in C, the acts in A
are indirectly selected over the acts in C. Write A IS B if there are sequences (An)∞n=1 and
(Bn)∞n=1 so that An → A, Bn → B and An IS Bn for all n, i.e. IS is the sequential closure
of IS.
The final axiom, Continuity, requires that each c(·|ω) satisfies a weak continuity condition
and that sequences of indirect selections do not contradict domination.
17Consequentialism implies Subjective Consequentialism: since c(B|·) is P -measurable, P (ω) ⊂ {ω′′ :
c(B|ω′′) = c(B|ω)} for every B and ω.
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Axiom 5. (Continuity) For any {Bn}∞n=1 ⊂ K(F):
(i) If fn ∈ c(Bn|ω) and
{ω′ : c(B|ω′) = c(B|ω)} = {ω′ : c(Bn|ω′) = c(Bn|ω)}
for every n ∈ N, then Bn → B and fn → f imply that f ∈ c(B|ω).
(ii) If {f} IS {g} and g dominates f , then f dominates g as well.
The first condition of Continuity is a restriction of upper hemi-continuity.18 It requires
that this property holds only if the DM reveals that her choice is conditioned on the same
information along the sequence and as it is at the limit. Both parts of Continuity are implied
by combining WARP and upper hemi-continuity.
To interpret the second condition of the axiom, note that INRA suggests that the DM’s
set of choices from problem A is better than her set of choices from problem B whenever
she chooses an act in A when facing B conditional on every state of the world. This direct
ranking is incomplete but can be extended using finite sequences of choices to allow for
indirect comparisons as well. These indirect comparisons are captured when the acts in A are
indirectly selected over the acts in B. Because this ranks many more sets of choices, indirect
selections are important for characterizing optimal inattention. Continuity insures a minimal
consistency between these indirect comparisons and her direct comparisons. Specifically,
suppose that f dominates g and g does not dominate f . Continuity implies that if B is
sufficiently close to {g} and A is sufficiently close to {f}, then the DM does not indirectly
select the acts in B over the acts in A.
3.2. Characterization Result. I can now state the main result: if the DM’s choices satisfy
the five axioms above, then she acts as if she has optimal inattention.
Theorem 1. If c(·) satisfies INRA, ACI, Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism and
Continuity, then c(·) has an optimal inattention representation.
Theorem 1 shows that the above axioms are sufficient for the DM to have optimal inatten-
tion. For a discussion of the key ideas in its proof, see Appendix A. Necessity is more com-
plicated because I have not restricted attention to well-behaved tie-breaking rules. Consider
two conditional choice correspondences, c(·) and c′(·), that both have optimal inattention
representations with the same prior, utility index, and attention constraint. When their at-
tention constraint is not a singleton, it is possible that the former has subjective information
Q when facing the problem B, while the latter has subjective information Q′ when facing
B. This arises when a problem has multiple optimal subjective information partitions (i.e.
the right hand side of (1) is not a singleton) and the DM must break ties between them. If
18This follows from Aliprantis and Border [2006, Cor 17.17].
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she breaks these ties non-systematically, then the DM may violate ACI or INRA.19 Though
the axioms become necessary if I impose some conditions on tie-breaking when defining the
model, Theorem 2 shows that the set of problems for which an optimally inattentive DM
fails to satisfy either INRA or ACI is non-generic even without any such conditions.20
Theorem 2. If c(·) has an optimal inattention representation, then c(·) satisfies Monotonic-
ity, Subjective Consequentialism and Continuity. Moreover, there is a conditional choice
correspondence c′(·) satisfying INRA, ACI, Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism and
Continuity as well as an open, dense K ⊂ K(F) so that
(i) c(·) and c′(·) have optimal inattention representations parametrized by
(u(·), pi(·), Pˆ (·),P∗) and (u(·), pi(·), Qˆ(·),P∗), respectively, and
(ii) c(B|ω) = c′(B|ω) for every ω ∈ Ω and B ∈ K.
Theorem 2 implies that INRA and ACI are generically necessary. This is because the set
of problems for which ties can occur is “small.” Consequently, INRA and ACI capture the
economic content of optimal inattention. Though not strictly necessary, for any given prior,
utility index and attention constraint, there are always attention rules that satisfy INRA
and ACI.
3.3. Special cases. To understand the role of the axioms in the characterization, I charac-
terize the two special cases of optimal inattention mentioned at the start of this section, the
Bayesian model and the fixed attention model.
Corollary 1. c(·) satisfies Consequentialism in addition to INRA, ACI, Monotonicity, and
Continuity if and only if c(·) has a Bayesian representation.
Intuitively, Consequentialism requires that the DM respects the objective information
structure. For an optimally inattentive DM, this implies that she processes all information
and chooses the act that maximizes expected utility. Since Consequentialism implies Sub-
jective Consequentialism, c(·) has an optimal inattention representation and must have a
Bayesian representation.
19A similar issue exists for random expected utility (Gul and Pesendorfer [2006]) with a finite state space. If
ties are broken using a “regular” random expected utility function, then choices satisfy linearity, but if ties
are broken differently, then linearity may fail.
20Say that an optimal inattention representation is regular if for any A,B ∈ K(F) and g ∈ F , Pˆ (B) =
Pˆ (αB + (1− α){g}) and arg maxf∈A Epi[u ◦ f |Pˆ (A)(ω)] = arg maxf∈A Epi[u ◦ f |Pˆ (B)(ω)] for all ω whenever
c(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ for all ω. Given Theorems 1 and 2, one can verify that c(·) has regular optimal inattention
if and only if c(·) satisfies all six axioms.
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Corollary 2. The following are equivalent:
(i) c(·) satisfies Independence in addition to INRA, Monotonicity, Subjective Consequen-
tialism and Continuity.
(ii) c(·) satisfies WARP in addition to ACI, Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism
and Continuity.
(iii) c(·) has a fixed attention representation.
It immediately follows that WARP and Independence are equivalent for an optimally
inattentive DM. The intuition behind Corollary 2 is that an optimally inattentive DM’s
choices from A and B violate Independence or WARP only if her subjective information
differs at A, B or αA+(1−α)B. If her subjective information never changes, then she never
violates either condition. Consequently, she has fixed attention if she satisfies either WARP
or Independence.
3.4. Counter-examples. To help understand the role of the axioms, I provide a series of
counterexamples showing what may go wrong if one or more of the axioms are not satis-
fied. An alternative model of particular interest is the inattention model. An inattentive
DM maximizes expected utility conditional on her subjective information, but her subjective
information is not necessarily optimal. Although she has stable tastes and beliefs, the infor-
mation to which she pays attention varies with the problem in a general manner. Formally,
c(·) has an inattention representation if Equation (2) holds for all problems B and states ω
but the source of Pˆ (·) is left unspecified.
Proposition 1. If c(·) has an inattention representation, then c(·) satisfies Monotonicity,
Subjective Consequentialism and Continuity (i).
In particular, an inattentive DM’s choices may violate INRA, ACI or Continuity (ii).
Consequently, these three axioms reflect the optimality of her subjective information. They
capture her reaction to her attention constraint but not that she exhibits inattention in the
first place.21
ACI reflects that the DM has an attention constraint. Consider the alternative model is
costly attention. In this case, rather than being subject to a constraint on the information
to which she can attend, the DM incurs a cost if she pays attention to a given partition. A
function ρ : {Q : Q  P} → [0,∞] is a cost function if ρ({Ω}) = 0 and Q  Q′ implies
ρ(Q) ≥ ρ(Q′). Formally, c(·) has a costly attention representation if there is an optimally
inattentive agent and a cost function ρ(·) so that
(3) Pˆ (B) ∈ arg max
Q
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E)]− ρ(Q)
21A characterization of the inattention model is available as supplementary material.
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for every problem B and Equation (2) holds for every problem B and state ω. Given
appropriate tie-breaking, this model satisfies all of the axioms except ACI. In fact, it satisfies
the following weaker version of ACI:
αf + (1− α)g ∈ c(αB + (1− α){g}|ω) ⇐⇒ αf + (1− α)h ∈ c(αB + (1− α){h}|ω)
for a fixed α ∈ (0, 1].22
INRA reflects that the DM’s subjective information is optimal. If her subjective informa-
tion cannot be represented as maximizing behavior, then the DM’s choices violate INRA. For
instance, suppose that Equation (1) holds when a minimum replaces each maxima and Equa-
tion (2) is satisfied. In this case, the DM’s choices violate INRA but satisfy the remaining
axioms.23
I now turn to Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism, and Continuity. If the utility
index depends on the state, then the DM satisfies all axioms except Monotonicity. Fix a set
of full support probability measures {piω}ω∈Ω that containing at least two distinct measures.
If
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpiω,
then the DM violates Subjective Consequentialism but satisfies the other axioms. The
counter-example for Continuity involves lexicographic preferences. I defer it to Appendix C,
which also contains details on the above counter-examples.
4. Identification
To interpret a model, it is important to understand how precisely the parameters are
identified, i.e. what are the uniqueness properties of the representation. For instance, if
certain parameters of the representation are not unique, then doing comparative statics is
impossible. How much identification is possible within the current framework, given that the
modeler does not directly observe ex ante preference, subjective information, or capacity for
attention and that the DM’s choices violate WARP? Of the four components that characterize
an optimally inattentive agent, Theorem 3 shows that three are suitably unique, and in many
cases of interest, all four are unique.
Before stating Theorem 3, one issue deserves elaboration. In general, many attention
rules represent the same choice correspondence; for instance, if B contains only constant
acts, then Pˆ (B) could be any partition. However, there is a unique canonical attention
rule, given by the coarsest attention rule that represents choice. That is, Pˆ (·) is canonical
if (u(·), pi(·),P∗, Pˆ (·)) represents c(·) and for any (u′(·), pi′(·),P′∗, Qˆ(·)) that also represents
22A full characterization of this model is work in progress.
23It is possible that Continuity (ii) is also violated. This is not surprising the interpretation of Continuity
(ii) relies on INRA.
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c(·), Qˆ(B) Pˆ (B) for every B. The canonical attention rule is the partition
(4) ˆˆP (B) = {{ω′ : c(B|ω′) = c(B|ω)} : ω ∈ Ω}.
To interpret this normalization, if paying attention to a finer partition has an arbitrarily
small but positive cost, then the DM would always choose a canonical attention rule – she
can make the same conditional choice in every state but avoid paying the cost. On the one
hand, her subjective information may be finer than that given by her canonical attention
rule. That is, she may pay attention to a partition strictly finer than it but make the same
conditional choices on at least two cells. On the other hand, her subjective information must
be at least as fine as it because otherwise, she does not pay attention to information that
distinguishes two state on which she makes different conditional choices.
Theorem 3. If c(·) is non-degenerate and represented by the optimally inattentive agents
(u1(·), pi1(·),P∗1, Pˆ1(·)) and (u2(·), pi2(·),P∗2, Pˆ2(·)), then:
(i) u1(·) is a positive affine transformation of u2(·),
(ii) there is a partition Q P so that pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E) for any E ∈ Q,
(iii) P∗1 = P∗2, and
(iv) Pˆ1(·) = Pˆ2(·) whenever Pˆ1(·) and Pˆ2(·) are both canonical.
Theorem 3 establishes that an optimally inattentive DM’s utility index, attention rule and
attention constraint are unique. However, her prior probability measure may not be. Because
ex ante preference is unobserved, the DM’s choices only reveal the likelihood of events that
are relevant for choosing either her act or her subjective information. For this reason, the
modeler can uniquely identify the DM’s prior only up to conditioning on a partition Q, which
will be characterized below. Note that a coarser Q implies more precise identification, in the
sense that fewer probability measures represent choices for given “true” prior beliefs. Since
P  Q, the prior of an optimally inattentive DM is identified at least as precisely as that
of a Bayesian DM.
In many cases, Q = {Ω}, and the prior is uniquely identified. For instance, Q = {Ω}
whenever P∗ is all partitions coarser than P with at most κ elements and κ is less than the
number of cells in P . One notable case where uniqueness does not obtain is when the DM
is Bayesian; in this case, the coarsest Q is equal to P .
I now turn to characterizing the coarsest Q. This partition is the set of “minimal isolatable
events.” Intuitively, E is an isolatable event if any choice problem can be partitioned into
two distinct problems – one that depends on E and one that depends on Ec – so that either
of the two can be varied without changing the DM’s conditional choices of acts. The relative
likelihood of events contained in different isolatable events is not relevant for her choices.
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To define an isolatable event formally, first let
BE,xB
′ = {fEx : f ∈ B} ∪ {gEcx : g ∈ B′}
for any problems B,B′ and any consequence x. The problem BE,xB′ is formed by combining
the two problems B and B′ into a single problem containing modifications of the acts in B
so they differ from each other only on E and of the acts in B′ so they differ from each other
only on Ec.
Definition 3. E is an isolatable event if for any B so that the right hand side of Equation
(1) is a singleton and any B′, whenever z /∈ c({g(ω′), z}|ω′) for any g ∈ B ∪B′ and ω′, both
f ∈ c(B|ω) =⇒ fEz ∈ c(BE,zB′|ω)
for all ω ∈ E and
f ∈ c(B|ω) =⇒ fEcz ∈ c(BEc,zB′|ω)
for all ω ∈ Ec hold.24
That is, whenever z is a bad enough outcome, the modifications of the DM’s choices from
B are still chosen from the problems BE,zB′ and BEc,zB′, regardless of the contents of B′.
Say that an isolatable event is minimal if it does not contain any other non-empty isolatable
events. Note that Ω is always an isolatable event, but may not be minimal.
Lemma 1. If Q is the coarsest partition satisfying (ii), then E is a minimal isolatable event
if and only if E ∈ Q.
If the DM is Bayesian, then each E ∈ P is a minimal isolatable event. However in the
introductory example, the only isolatable event is Ω. When the DM is Bayesian, each element
of the objective information is a minimal isolatable event, so it follows that her prior is only
identified up to its conditional probabilities on every element of P .
5. Comparative Attention and the Value of Information
There are two comparatives of interest. The first is to compare two distinct DMs that have
the same information. The second is to compare a single DM with two different objective
information partitions.
Consider DM1 and DM2 with conditional choice correspondences given by c(·) and c′(·),
respectively. Denote by ˆˆPc(B) the canonical subjective information of c(·) when facing B
and by ˆˆPc′(B) the canonical subjective information of c′(·) when facing B using Equation
(4). Note that these are defined from choices alone.
24One can define this condition from choices without referring to P∗, but it is simpler to define it this way.
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Definition 4. c(·) is more attentive than c′(·) if for any B, there exists a B′ so that
ˆˆ
Pc(B′) = ˆˆPc′(B).
To understand this comparison, suppose that the modeler observes that c′(·) pays attention
to Q when facing B, i.e. her canonical subjective information is Q. If c(·) is more attentive
than c′(·), then there is a B′ so that the modeler observes that c(·) pays attention to Q
when facing B′. That is, whenever the modeler observes DM2 using information Q, the
modeler also observes DM1 using Q, though possibly when facing a different choice problem.
Theorem 4 shows that this comparison is equivalent to comparing their attention constraints
when both DMs have optimal inattention.
Theorem 4. If c(·) and c′(·) are non-degenerate and have optimal inattention representa-
tions, parametrized by (uc, pic,P∗c , Pˆc) and (uc′ , pic′ ,P∗c′ , Pˆc′) respectively, then:
c(·) ismore attentive than c′(·) ⇐⇒ P∗c′ ⊂ P∗c .
That is, c(·) is more attentive than c′(·) if and only if her attention constraint is larger.
Note that their representations may have different priors and tastes. Therefore, P∗ reflects
the DM’s capacity for attention: whenever P∗c′ ⊂ P∗c , DM1 has a higher capacity for attention
than DM2.
Another interesting comparative is how a DM reacts to changes in the available informa-
tion. Up to now, I have considered a fixed information structure. I modify the primitives in
order to allow the objective information to vary. This generalization allows me to consider
the value of information to an optimally inattentive DM. Consider a set of finite partitions,
P , that represent the possible objective information. Suppose the DM’s choices given ob-
jective information P are represented by a conditional choice correspondence indexed by
P ∈ P , i.e. cP : K(F) × Ω → K(F) where cP (B|ω) ⊂ B and cP (B|·) is P -measurable. I
assume throughout that each cP (·) has an optimal inattention representation parametrized
by (u, pi,P∗P , Pˆ (·)). In Appendix B.3, I provide a sufficient condition for this specification.
I now consider the value of inattention to an optimally inattentive DM. The typical for-
mulation (for instance, Blackwell [1953]) says that Q1 is objectively more valuable than Q2
if the expected utility that a DM can obtain by choosing from any problem B is higher when
she conditions her choices on Q1 than when she conditions her choices on Q2, regardless of
her utility index and prior. To state this formally, define
V (Q,B, u, pi) =
∑
E∈Q
pi(E) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E)
for every Q ∈ P , problem B, utility index u and probability measure pi. Say that Q1 is
objectively more valuable than Q2 if and only if
V (Q1, B, u, pi) ≥ V (Q2, B, u, pi)
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for every problem B, utility index u and prior pi.
This definition only makes sense if the DM in the absence of inattention because an
inattentive DM may not be able to condition her choices on the objective information.
Instead, I propose the following alternative: Q1 is subjectively more valuable than Q2 if and
only if
max
Q′∈P∗Q1
V (Q′, B, u, pi) ≥ max
Q′∈P∗Q2
V (Q′, B, u, pi)
for every problem B, utility index u and prior pi. A key difference between the two notions
is that whether Q1 is subjectively more valuable than Q2 depends on the DM under consid-
eration – DM1 may regard Q1 as subjectively more valuable than Q2 while DM2 reverses
the ranking.
Theorem 5 relates this comparison to comparative capacity for attention. Note that “more
attentive than” is defined for a fixed information structure, but can be easily adapted to our
present context where the information structure varies. I omit a formal restatement.
Theorem 5. For any Q1, Q2 ∈ P, Q1 is subjectively more valuable than Q2 if and only if
cQ1(·) is more attentive than cQ2(·).
One case where objectively and subjectively more valuable agree is if the DM is Bayesian.
Another case where the equivalence between (i) and (iii) holds is if
P∗P = {Q′  P : Q′ has atmost κ elements}
for every P ∈ P . In general, however, the equivalence fails.25 This accords with some real-life
evidence on information overload. For instance, when choosing between health care plans,
DMs may become overwhelmed by the sheer amount of information available and make
decisions based on less information as more is provided. The contrast between objective and
subjective valuation of information is one step towards analyzing information overload.26
6. Application: Markets with Optimally Inattentive Consumers
This section argues that inattention may increase competition among firms and benefit
consumers. I use a simple model to show that, in equilibrium, more attentive consumers may
have less expected consumer surplus. The key idea is that in order for firms that produce
differentiated products to exploit their market power, consumers must pay attention to the
differences between the products. If consumers are optimally inattentive, then firms must
compete with each other for attention, even if their products would not compete given that
25Suppose that Ω = {a, b, c, d}, P = {{a, b}, {c, d}}, Q = {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}} and P∗Q′ = {{E,Ec} : E ∈ Q}
for Q′ ∈ {P,Q}. Then for B = {(100, 100,−100,−100), (−100,−100, 100, 100)}, facing P yields a higher ex
ante expected utility than facing Q.
26Further work along this line is in progress.
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consumers were Bayesian. This result contrasts with several papers demonstrating that firms
benefit when consumers exhibit inattention; for instance, Rubinstein [1993].
To illustrate the model, I return to the example in Section 1.2, but suppose now that the
drugs are non-prescription, the patient must pay out of pocket, and the patient has access
to the same information that the doctor did. The patient purchases at most one of the
drugs and observes the price of all three drugs before deciding which to purchase. If she
processes all available information and the three firms compete by setting prices, then each
firm picks a price that extracts her entire surplus whenever its drug is most effective.27 In
contrast, if the patient cannot process all of her information and is optimally inattentive,
then consumer surplus must be positive in equilibrium. To see this, suppose that one firm
sets a price that would extract all surplus. The patient has no incentive to pay attention to
information revealing if that firm’s drug is effective. Consequently, to induce the patient to
pay attention to information about its drug’s effectiveness, each firm must set a price that
gives positive consumer surplus.
6.1. Model. There are n risk-neutral firms. Each costlessly produce one of m ≥ 3 distinct,
non-divisible goods. A market φ is an element of {1, ...,m}n with the interpretation that firm
i produces product φi. Let nµ(φ) be the number of firms who have a monopoly on producing
a good of a given type, and nc(φ) be the number of goods produced competitively, i.e. by at
least two firms. All consumers and firms know the type of product that each firm produces.
A risk-neutral consumer purchases at most one unit of the good. The state space is
Ω = {1, ...,m}, and the consumer values a good at 1 if its type matches the state and
otherwise values it at 0. She initially assigns equal probability to each state and has access
to information that reveals the state of the world perfectly, i.e. her objective information is
P = {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}. She has optimal inattention with an attention constraint parametrized
by κ where
P∗ = {Q P : #Q ≤ κ}.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the state of the world is determined. Then,
firms simultaneously choose a price without observing the state. Next, each consumer ob-
serves the price. Finally, each consumer chooses her subjective information, observes its
realization, and purchases from one of the firms.
Let φi(q) be the act of buying from firm i in market φ at price q, so that
u(φi(q))(ω) =
1− q if ω = φi−q otherwise .
27Similarly, if the consumer has fixed attention, then any firm whose information she distinguishes can extract
all surplus.
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A pair (φ, p), where φ is a market and p ∈ Rn+ is a price vector, corresponds to the problem
{φi(pi) : i ≤ n} ∪ {∅}, where ∅ is not buying from any firm. An equilibrium for a given
market φ is a price vector p ∈ Rn+ so that each firm j in φ maximizes expected profit given
p−j and the choices of the consumer.
6.2. Equilibrium. In any equilibrium where there are more products available than the
consumer has the capacity to differentiate between, i.e. attention is scarce, then the effective
equilibrium price is zero.
Proposition 2. For any market φ, if p is an equilibrium for φ and the consumer purchases
from firm j, then nc(φ) + nµ(φ) > κ implies that pj = 0, and nc(φ) + nµ(φ) ≤ κ implies that
for any j, either pj = 1 or pj = 0, where pj = 1 if and only if j has a monopoly.
To illustrate, consider first the case where there are n = 6 firms, m = 3 products and
the market is φ = (1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3). Two firms produce each type of product. If κ = 3, then
the consumer is Bayesian and a firm makes a sale only if the product it produces matches
the state of the world. Since consumers know the state of the world, in every state j,
the two firms of type j play the Bertrand duopoly game with marginal cost equal to zero.
Consequently, the only equilibrium is p = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Consider the same market where κ = 2. The same price vector is an equilibrium, but
the consumer behaves differently. The consumer pays attention to {{j}, {j}c} for some
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and in state j, she is indifferent between purchasing from either of the two
firms with type j; in any other state, she is indifferent between purchasing from any of
the four remaining firms. WLOG, assume that the consumer’s subjective information is
{{1}, {2, 3}}.
Now, suppose firms 5 and 6 exit the market, so there are n′ = 4 firms and the market is
φ′ = (1, 2, 3, 1). If κ = 3, then firms 2 and 3 have monopolies on producing goods of type
2 and 3, respectively, so both these firms charge 1. In contrast, firms 1 and 4 both produce
good 1, so they compete as a Bertrand duopoly. The unique equilibrium price vector is
(0, 1, 1, 0), and consumers get expected consumer surplus equal to 13 .
But if κ = 2, then an equilibrium price vector is (0, 0, 0, 0). Firms 1 and 4 compete as
a duopoly; if either charged a positive price and made a sale, the other could undercut the
price and make a larger profit. Since firm 1 sets a price equal to zero, the consumer must
decide whether to pay attention to information that distinguishes either state 2 or state 3.
To attract the customer, firms 2 and 3 must offer the consumer surplus conditional on paying
attention to the information that reveals whether their product is optimal. Again, if either
charged a positive price and made a sale, the other makes zero profit. The firm without
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Figure 2. Expected Consumer Surplus with n = m = 5 and nc(φ) = 0
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a sale could undercut the other’s price, causing the consumer to pay attention to different
information and make a sale.28
Though the above equilibrium is not unique, in any equilibrium to the game, no firm that
charges a positive price makes a sale with positive probability in equilibrium. Intuitively, if
two firms share a type, and the first charges a positive price and makes a sale with positive
probability, then the second can undercut its price to capture the whole market. Competition
between the two firms drives the price to zero. If no other firm shares a type with a firm
that charges a positive price, then the consumer does not pay attention to information about
that firm’s product. Consequently, if any firm charges a positive price, then no consumer
purchases from it.
For a given market φ and price vector p, expected consumer surplus weakly increases with
κ. However, equilibrium consumer surplus is non-monotonic in κ for the above market – it
is maximized at κ = 2. Proposition 3 characterizes equilibrium consumer surplus for any
market.
28This can also be seen using Monotonicity and INRA. Define B(p2, p3) = (φ, (0, p2, p3, 0, 0, 0)) and
B′(p2, p3) = (φ′, (0, p2, p3, 0)) for p2, p3 ≥ 0. Identify B′(p2, p3) as the natural subset of B(p2, p3), i.e.
φ′i(p) is φi(p) for i ≤ 4. Suppose p3 = 0 and that p2 > 0. Because φ5(0) dominates φ2(p2),
c(B(p2, p3)|ω) = c(B(0, p3)|ω)\{φ2(p2)}
for every ω ∈ Ω by Monotonicity and INRA. Since
c(B(p2, p3)|ω) ∩B′(p2, p3) 6= ∅
for every ω ∈ Ω, INRA implies that
φ2(p2) /∈ c(B′(p2, p3)|ω)
for every ω. Consequently, firm 2 is indifferent between charging 0 and any other price. Repeating the above
arguments but swapping p3 with p2 and firm 2 with firm 3 shows that the same holds for firm 3, so (0, 0, 0, 0)
is an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the expected consumer surplus is 23 , larger than with κ = 3.
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Proposition 3. In any equilibrium for φ, expected total surplus is equal to 1
m
min(nµ(φ) +
nc(φ), κ), and expected consumer surplus equals 1mκ if κ < nµ(φ) + nc(φ) and equals
1
m
nc(φ)
if κ ≥ nµ(φ) + nc(φ).
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3 graphically. In a market with five firms that each produce
different products, expected consumer surplus is maximized at κ = 4 and minimized at κ = 5.
Similarly, expected profit is maximized when κ = 5 and equals 0 for any other value of κ.
Proposition 3 shows that this non-monotonicity occurs whenever nc(φ) < κ.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have axiomatically characterized the properties of conditional choices that
are necessary and sufficient for the DM to act as if she has optimal inattention. These axioms
provide a choice-theoretic justification for the theory that agents respond to their limited
attention optimally. The optimal inattention model is a versatile model with interesting
implications: Dow [1991], Rubinstein [1993], and Gul et al. [2011] all consider consumers
who conform exactly to the optimal inattention model.
Related papers by de Olivera [2012] and Mihm and Ozbek [2012] study rational inattention
as revealed by a DM’s ex ante preference over menus of acts.29 Their representation of
preference is similar to my own, but the primitives are very different. The DM chooses a
menu in the anticipation that she will receive information and can choose what information
to process at some cost.
Caplin and Martin [2012] study a related model, optimal framing. If frames are inter-
preted as states, then their analysis can be interpreted similarly to mine. Our papers are
complementary, as their framework is designed for testing in the laboratory but does not
achieve as precise identification. Moreover, Caplin and Martin relate choices to one another
only through the existence of a utility function that solves a system of inequalities. In con-
trast to this paper, their primitive is stochastic choice, and their DM’s prior is known to the
modeler.
By way of conclusion, I compare the optimal inattention model with some other models
of inattention that have been considered by the literature. The most prominent example is
the rational inattention model, due to Sims [1998, 2003]. In this model, the constraint on
attention takes the form of restricting the mutual information, i.e. the reduction in entropy,
between actions and the state of the world. This constraint implies that conditional choices
are stochastic.30 One interpretation is that the agent has access to arbitrarily precise, and
29Ergin and Sarver [2010] can also be interpreted in this way, but it is not their focus.
30Recently, Matejka and McKay [2012] have studied this model’s implications in the context of discrete
choices. Their focus is on solving the model in a discrete setting, and in the course of analysis, they provide
testable implications in terms of choices from a suitably rich feasible set of actions. A full behavioral
characterization of the model, even in this setting, remains an open question.
FOUNDATIONS FOR OPTIMAL INATTENTION 24
arbitrarily imprecise, signals about the state of the world, but the modeler does not observe
the realization of this information. Another, offered by Woodford [2012], is that the agent’s
perception of information is stochastic. Both these interpretations are outside the scope of
my model: the objective information is known, and the agent’s perceptions are deterministic.
Mankiw and Reis [2002] introduce the sticky information model. It postulates that agents
update their information infrequently, and when they update, they obtain perfect informa-
tion. The key difference between this model in a static setting and optimal inattention is
that agents do not choose the information to which they pay attention.31
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Appendix A. Preview of the Proof of Theorem 1
This Section discusses the key idea behind the proof of Theorem 1. The key idea of the
proof is to map choices of acts onto a larger domain where it is suitably well-behaved. In
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particular, I consider the space of “plans.” A plan is a mapping from each state to an act.
Each set of conditional choices from a given menu defines one plan. In the example from
Section 1.2, the modeler observes the doctor’s conditional choices of acts. Instead of looking
at her each of her conditional choices in isolation, one can think of them as choosing one
plan. For instance, the doctor chooses the plan “pick g in state γ, otherwise pick m” from
{g,m} and chooses the plan “pick f in state φ, otherwise pick m” from {g,m, f}.
Although choice in a given state may violate WARP, INRA guarantees that her choice over
plan maximizes a preference relation (whose domain is plans rather than acts). However,
this preference relation may be discontinuous, incomplete and intransitive. Given the other
axioms, one can extend it to a well-behaved preference relation so that the DM’s choices
are a maximal element of this preference relation.32 I then show that this preference over
plans can be represented as expected utility over a subset of “feasible” plans. I identify a
candidate for P∗ and show that any plan measurable with respect to some Q ∈ P∗ is feasible.
The coarsest partition that measures her chosen plan is identified as the DM’s subjective
information. This subjective information is optimal, in the sense that it maximizes expected
utility according to the utility index and prior representing the preference over plans. The
final step shows that her conditional choices can also be represented as maximizing this
preference relation.
This suggests an alternative domain on which optimal inattention admits foundations:
preference over plans. In supplementary material, I show that one can use preference over
plans to derive both optimal inattention and costly attention representations. Observing
choice of plan is more convenient because it requires observing a single ex ante choice rather
than choices in each state of the world. It has also been used in applications (for instance,
Gul et al. [2011]). However, this has some significant drawbacks. First, choice of plan is
difficult to observe outside of a laboratory. Second, choice of plan typically reflects both
constraints and true preference. Third, what a DM plans to choose may differ from what she
actually chooses. Fourth, economic objects of interest are conditional choices, not ex ante
choices. Therefore, I focus in the main paper on choice of acts. This data is closer to what
economists typically work with, and reflects the DM’s response to whatever constraints she
faces rather than those she thinks that she will face. Moreover, if the DM follows through
with her choice of plan, then her final conditional choices of acts satisfy the axioms from
Section 3.
Appendix B. Proofs
B.1. Proofs from Section 3.
32Although this is an extension, it is typically not a “compatible extension” in the sense that it may not
preserve strict preference.
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B.1.1. Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. If c(B|ω) = B for all B ∈ K(X), then by Monotonicity, it follows that c(B|ω) =
B∀B ∈ K(F). Taking P∗ = {Ω} and u(x) = 0∀x establishes the desired result. Therefore,
assume that there are x∗, x∗ ∈ X and ω so that x∗ /∈ c({x∗, x∗}|ω).
Lemma 2. There exists an affine, continuous u : X → R so that for any B ∈ K(X),
x ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y) for all y ∈ B.
Proof. Fix any A ⊂ B ∈ K(X). By Monotonicity, if x ∈ c(B|ω), then x ∈ c(B|ω′) for any
ω′. By INRA, c(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ implies that c(B|ω) ∩ A = c(A|ω), i.e. c(·|ω) satisfies WARP
when restricted to problems of lotteries. It is routine to verify that the resulting revealed
preference relation satisfies the hypothesis of Grandmont [1972, Thm 2] and therefore an
affine, continuous u : X → R exists. 
Let FΩ be the set of functions from Ω to F that are σ(P ) measurable. I refer to elements
of FΩ as “plans” with the interpretation that the DM chooses F (ω) in state ω. Since P is
finite, any F ∈ FΩ is simple. I denote elements of X by x, y, z, ... , elements of F by f, g, h, ...
and elements of FΩ by F,G,H, .... Identify X with the subset of F that does not vary with
the state and F with the subset of FΩ that does not vary with the state, so X ⊂ F ⊂ FΩ.
Denote by A(·) the partition defined as ˆˆP (·) in Equation (4) and define cˆ : K(F)  FΩ by
F ∈ cˆ(B) ⇐⇒ F (ω) ∈ c(B|ω) for every ω and σ(F ) ⊂ σ(A(B)). Since σ(A(B)) ⊂ σ(P ),
any σ(A(B))-measurable selection from c(B|·) is in FΩ. For any F ∈ FΩ, define {F} ∈ K(F)
by {F} = {F (ω) : ω ∈ Ω}. Since F is simple, {F} is finite and compact. By INRA, if
F ∈ cˆ(B) then F ∈ cˆ({F}).
Define C ⊂ FΩ by F ∈ C ⇐⇒ F ∈ cˆ({F}); C is the set of plans that the DM chose from
some problem. Define a binary relation ˆ on C by
F ˆG ⇐⇒ {F} IS {G}.
Note that F ∈ cˆ(B) =⇒ F ˆG for every G ∈ C so that {G} ⊂ B. For any F ∈ FΩ,
define F ∗ ∈ F to be F ∗(ω) = F (ω)(ω).
Lemma 3. If F ∈ cˆ({F}), then F ∗∼ˆF .
Proof. Assume that F = cˆ({F}) and define Fˆ so that
Fˆ (ω) = F (ω)A({F})(ω)x
for some x ∈ X so that u(x) ≤ u(F (ω))∀ω. It holds that Fˆ ∈ cˆ({F} ∪ {Fˆ}). To see this,
note that
u ◦ Fˆ (ω) ≤ u ◦ F (ω)
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for all ω so it must be that F ∈ cˆ({F} ∪ {Fˆ}) by monotonicity and INRA. Therefore,
A({F} ∪ {Fˆ}) A({F}). For any ω, so that A({F} ∪ {Fˆ})(ω) ⊂ A({F})(ω) so since
F (ω)(ω′) = Fˆ (ω)(ω′)∀ω′ ∈ A({F})(ω),
it follows from Subjective Consequentialism and F (ω) ∈ c({F}∪{Fˆ}|ω) that Fˆ (ω) ∈ c({F}∪
{Fˆ}|ω). By INRA, Fˆ = cˆ({Fˆ}). Further, if F ∗∼ˆFˆ , it follows that F ∗∼ˆF .
By construction, A({Fˆ}) is finer than A({F ∗}). By ACI,
αFˆ + (1− α)F ∗ ∈ cˆ(α{Fˆ}+ (1− α){F ∗})
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Further
u ◦ αFˆ (ω) + (1− α)F ∗ ≥ u ◦ Fˆ (ω)
by construction. Therefore, when Bα = (α{F ∗}+ (1− α){Fˆ}) ∪ {Fˆ}
αFˆ + (1− α)F ∗ ∈ cˆ(Bα)
by INRA. Since A(Bα) A({Fˆ}) for any α ∈ [0, 1) and for any ω,
[αF ∗ + (1− α)Fˆ (ω)](ω′) = Fˆ (ω)(ω′)
for all ω′ ∈ A({Fˆ})(ω), by Subjective Consequentialism
Fˆ ∈ cˆ(Bα).
Therefore, for n ∈ {1, 2, ...}, {F} IS n−1
n
{F ∗}+ 1
n
{Fˆ}, which goes to {F ∗}, and by definition
F ˆF ∗. Since F ∗ ∈ cˆ({F ∗} ∪ {Fˆ}), it follows that F ∗ˆF ; combining yields F ∼ˆF ∗. 
Lemma 4. For any h ∈ F , α ∈ [0, 1] and A,B ∈ K(F), if AIS B, then αA + (1 −
α){h} IS αB + (1− α){h}.
Proof. There are sequences (An)∞n=1 and (Cn)∞n=1 that converge to A and B respectively
where An IS Cn.
Consider an arbitrary n and the finite sequence B1, ..., Bm so that An = B1 and Bm = Cn
and c(Bi|ω) ∩ Bi−1 6= ∅ for every ω. Since A(Bi)  A({h}), c(αBi + (1 − α){h}|ω) ∩
[αBi−1 + (1− α){h}] for every ω by ACI. Since αAn + (1− α){h} = αB1 + (1− α){h} and
αBm + (1− α){h} = αCn + (1− α){h}, αAn + (1− α){h} IS αCn + (1− α){h}.
Since n was arbitrary, we can do this for all n. Note that αAn + (1− α){h} → αA+ (1−
α){h} and αCn + (1− α){h} → αB + (1− α){h}, it follows that αA+ (1− α){h} IS αB +
(1− α){h}. 
Lemma 5. ˆ is transitive.
Proof. Suppose F ˆG and GˆH. Set A = {F}, B = {G} and C = {H}. Then F,G,H ∈ C,
AIS B and B IS C.
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Then there are sequence An, Bn, B′n, Cn that converge to A,B,B,C respectively so that
An IS Bn and B′n IS Cn. Pick Gn ∈ cˆ(B′n), noting that {Gn} IS Cn by INRA. Let y be the
worst outcome of any act in B. Let z ∈ X be so that u(y) − u(z) = k > 0 (if such an
outcome does not exist, replace each problem by mixing it with x∗). Pick Fn ∈ cˆ(B′n) for
every n. Note that {Fn} IS Cn for every n using INRA.
Because u(·) is continuous, for any  > 0 there is a δ() so that d(x, x′) < δ() implies that
|u(x) − u(x′)| < . Therefore, for any  there is an n() so that for any every n > n() and
any act f ′ ∈ {Gn} there is an act f ∈ Bn so that u(f(ω))− u(f ′(ω)) <  (for every ω) and
u(f ′(ω)) > u(y)− .
Take a sub-sequence of B′n and Bn so that Bni = Bn( 1
i
)+1 and B′ni = B
′
n( 1
i
)+1. Pick i¯ so
that 1
i¯
< k. Set αi =
1
ni
(u(y)− 1
ni
−u(z)) for every i > i¯. Consider f = Fni(ω) for an arbitrary ω
and i > i¯. Pick f ′ ∈ {Gni} so that u(f(ω′))− u(f ′(ω′)) <  for every ω′. Note that for every
ω′
(1− α)u(f(ω′)) + αu(z)− u(f ′(ω′)) = u(f(ω′))− u(f ′(ω′))− α(u(f(ω′))− u(z))
<
1
ni
− α(u(f(ω′))− u(z))
<
1
ni
− α(u(y) + 1
ni
− u(z)).
Therefore, for every ω,
u ◦ ((1− αi)Fni(ω) + αiz) ≤ u ◦ f ′
for some f ′ ∈ {Gni}.
By Monotonicity and INRA, cˆ(Bni) ⊂ cˆ(Bni ∪ ((1 − αi){Gni} + αi{z})) for i < i¯. By
Lemma 4, {Gni} IS Cni implies that (1−αi){Gni}+αi{z} IS (1−αi)Cni +αi{z}. But then
for i > i¯k Ani IS (1−αi)Cni +αi{z} and since αi → 0, Ani → A and Cni → C, we have A IS
C. Suppose we needed to mix all problems with x∗ first. The amount of this mixture can be
arbitrarily small. So using the same logic, we can find a sub-sequence (nk)∞k=1and a sequence
(αk)∞k=1 where αk → 0 so that (k−1k Ank + 1k{x∗}) IS (1 − αk)(k−1k Cnk + 1k{x∗}) + αk{z} for
every k. Again, this gives A I¯S C. Conclude that F ˆH. 
Define P∗ = {A(B) : B ∈ K(F)} and P∗∗ = {Q ∈ P∗ : @Q′ ∈ P∗ s.t. Q′  Q}. Identify
FΩQ with the subset of FΩ that is σ(Q)−measurable.
Define the binary relation  on FΩ by
F  G ⇐⇒ either F ∈ H and F ∗ˆG∗ or G /∈ H
 is a consistent extension of ˆ.
Lemma 6.  extends ˆ consistently.
Proof. Suppose first that F,G ∈ H and that G ∈ FΩQ .
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[F ˆG implies F  G] Suppose F ˆG. Then F,G ∈ C. By Lemma 3, F ∗∼ˆF and G∗∼ˆG.
Since ˆ is transitive, F ∗∼ˆF ˆG =⇒ F ∗ˆG. Since G∼ˆG∗, we have that F ∗ˆG∗ using
transitivity of ˆ.
[F ˆG implies F  G] There are two cases: G ∈ H and G /∈ H. In the latter case, it is
impossible that F ˆG. Therefore, it must be that both F,G ∈ C. For contradiction, assume
that F ˆG but F 6 G. Since F ˆG implies F  G, it must be that G  F (otherwise
F  G) so F ∗∼ˆG∗. Since F ∼ˆF ∗ and G∗∼ˆG and ˆ is transitive, it follows immediately that
G∼ˆF , a contradiction with F ˆG. 
For any act f ∈ F and partition Q ∈ P∗, define f¯Q ∈ FΩ as follows. If minx∈X u(x) does
not exist, then f¯Q(ω) = fQ(ω)x where x is so that u(x) = minx∈∪ω∈Ωsupp(G(ω)) u(x) − 1. If
minx∈X u(x) exists, then by f¯Q(ω) = fQ(ω)x where x is so that u(x) = minx∈X u(x).
Lemma 7.  is a preorder.
Proof. [Transitive] Suppose that F  G and G  H. If F /∈ H then G /∈ H so H /∈ H so
F  H. If G /∈ H then H /∈ H so F  H. If H /∈ H, then F  H. All that remains is the
case where F,G,H ∈ H which would imply that
F ∗ˆG∗ˆH∗
Since ˆ is transitive, F ∗ˆH∗ and F  H.
[Reflexive] Fix arbitrary F . If F /∈ H, then F  F by definition. If F ∈ H, then noting
that F ∗∼ˆF ∗ (since F ∗ ∈ cˆ({F ∗}) immediately gives F ∗ˆF ∗ and F  F . 
Lemma 8. If x, y ∈ X then either x  y or y  x.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 2. 
Lemma 9. For all e, f, g, h ∈ F , the set U = {λ ∈ [0, 1] : λf + (1− λ)g  λh+ (1− λ)e} is
closed in [0, 1].
Proof. Suppose λn → λ and λn ∈ U for all n. Then {λnf + (1 − λn)g} = Bn, {λnh + (1 −
λn)e} = Cn and Bn IS Cn by definition of . Therefore, for every n, there are sequences
(Bnm)∞m=1 and (Cnm)∞m=1 so that Bnm IS Cnm and d(Bnm, Bn) + d(Cnm, Cn) → 0. For every ,
there is an Mn so that m > Mn implies that d(Bnm, Bn) + d(Cnm, Cn) < . Since Bn →
{λf + (1 − λ)g} = B and Cn → {λh + (1 − λ)e} = C, for every , there is an N so that
n > N implies that d(Bn, B) + d(Cn, C) < .
For every n ∈ {1, 2, ...} define B′n and C ′n by
B′n = B
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1
and
C ′n = C
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1 .
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By the triangle inequality,
d(B′n, B) ≤ d(B,BN 1
n
+1) + d(BN 1
n
+1, B
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1 )
and
d(C ′n, C) ≤ d(C,CN 1
n
+1) + d(CN 1
n
+1, C
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1 ).
Since
d(B,BN 1
n
+1) + d(BN 1
n
+1, B
′
n) + d(C,CN 1
n
+1) + d(CN 1
n
+1, C
′
n) ≤
4
n
which goes to zero, B′n → B and C ′n → C; since B′n IS C ′n for every n, B IS C. It immediately
follows from the definition of  and U that λf + (1− λ)g  λh+ (1− λ)e so λ ∈ U . 
Lemma 10. For any f, g ∈ F , if f(ω)  g(ω) for all ω, then f  g.
Proof. For any f, g ∈ F so that f(ω)  g(ω) for every ω, it follows that f(ω) ∈ c({f(ω), g(ω)}|ω)
from Lemma 2. From monotonicity, f ∈ c({f, g}|ω)∀ω so f ∈ cˆ({f, g}) and f  g. 
Lemma 11. For any f, g, h ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1], f  g if and only if αf + (1 − α)h 
αg + (1− α)h.
Proof. Fix f, g, h ∈ F so that f  g. Let α ∈ (0, 1] be arbitrary. Since f  g, {f} I¯S {g}.
Apply Lemma 4 to get {αf+(1−α)h} I¯S {αg+(1−α)h}, implying that αf+(1−α)gˆαf+
(1− α)g so αf + (1− α)g  αf + (1− α)g. 
Given the above and Lemma 9, Lemma 1.2 of Shapley and Baucells [1998] gives that
αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h for α > 0 implies f  g.
Lemma 12. There are x, y ∈ X so that x  y.
Proof. Recall that x∗ /∈ cˆ({x∗, x∗}). Since A({x∗}) = A({x∗}) = {Ω} and x∗ ∈ cˆ({x∗, x∗})
by Lemma 2, x∗ weakly dominates x∗. It follows that x∗  x∗. Further, by Continuity, it is
not the case that {x∗} I¯S {x∗} so x∗  x∗. 
Lemma 13. If there is an x ∈ X so that u(f(ω)) > u(x) for every ω, then f¯Q ∈ cˆ({f¯Q}).
Proof. Fix any such f and relabel f¯Q = F¯ . Let y ∈ arg minx′∈∪ωsupp(F¯ (ω)) u(x′). Suppose not:
F¯ /∈ cˆ({F¯}) and H ∈ cˆ({F¯}).
It must be that A({F¯}) 6 Q. If A({F¯}) Q, pick any ω so that F¯ (ω) /∈ c({F¯}|ω). Take
h = H(ω)A({F¯})x. Since u◦H(ω) ≥ u◦h, H ∈ cˆ({F¯}∪{h}) and A({F¯}∪{h}) A({F¯}).
Further, by Subjective Consequentialism, h ∈ c({F¯} ∪ {h}|ω). However, u ◦ F¯ (ω) ≥ u ◦ h so
monotonicity implies that F¯ (ω) ∈ c({F¯} ∪ {h}|ω). Since h is never strictly relevant, INRA
implies that F¯ (ω) ∈ c({F¯}|ω), a contradiction.
Since A({F¯}) 6 Q, there is some E ∈ P so that u(H∗(ω)) = u(y)∀ω ∈ E. For every
ω /∈ E, u(F ∗(ω)) ≥ u(H∗(ω)). Therefore, F ∗ weakly dominates H∗ by monotonicity.
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Define H¯ ≡ H¯∗Q where Q = A({F¯}). By definition, there is some J so that J ∈ cˆ({J})
and A({J}) = Q. Since A({F ∗}) = {Ω}, αF ∗ + (1− α)J ∈ cˆ(α{F ∗}+ (1− α)J)
By INRA, monotonicity and Subjective Consequentialism, H¯ ∈ cˆ({H¯} ∪ {F¯}) and H¯∗ ∈
cˆ({H¯} ∪ {H¯∗}). Let B0 = α{H¯∗} + (1 − α){J∗}, B1 = α{H¯∗} ∪ {H¯} + (1 − α){J∗} and
B2 = α{H¯} ∪ {F¯}+ (1− α){J∗}. By ACI,
αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ ∈ cˆ(B1) ∩ cˆ(B0)
and
αH¯ + (1− α)J∗ ∈ cˆ(B2).
This implies that
(5) αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ˆαH¯ + (1− α)J∗ˆαF¯ + (1− α)J∗.
Set B4 = α{F ∗}+(1−α){J}. By ACI, αF ∗+(1−α)J(ω) ∈ c(B4|ω). Let B5 = B4∪{αF¯+
(1−α)J}. By INRA, monotonicity and Subjective Consequentialism, αF ∗+(1−α)J ∈ cˆ(B5).
By Subjective Consequentialism, αF¯ (ω) + (1 − α)J(ω) ∈ c(B5|ω) for all ω so by INRA,
αF¯ + (1− α)J ∈ C. Set B3 = B2 ∪ {αF¯ + (1− α)J}. By Monotonicity and INRA,
αH¯ + (1− α)J∗ ∈ cˆ(B3)
so αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ ˆαF¯ + (1− α)J .
By Lemma 3, αF¯ + (1− α)J∼ˆαF ∗ + (1− α)J∗. By Lemma 5,
αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ˆαF ∗ + (1− α)J∗
which, by definition, is equivalent
{αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗} IS {αF ∗ + (1− α)J∗}.
Since F ∗ dominates H¯∗ and H¯∗ does not dominate F ∗ by Monotonicity, αF ∗ + (1 − α)J∗
dominates αH¯∗+ (1−α)J∗ and αH¯∗+ (1−α)J∗ does not dominate αF ∗+ (1−α)J∗. This
contradicts Continuity, so f¯Q ∈ cˆ({f¯Q}). 
If Q ∈ P∗ and Q Q′, then Lemma 13 implies that Q′ ∈ P∗.
Lemma 14. Suppose F ∈ cˆ(B). If {G} ⊂ B, then F  G.
Proof. If G /∈ H, then F  G. If G ∈ H, then pick Q ∈ P∗ so that G ∈ FΩQ . There are two
cases.
First, suppose u(G∗(ω)) > u(x) for some x ∈ X and every ω. Set G¯ = ¯(G∗)Q. By
monotonicity F ∈ cˆ(B ∪ {G¯}). By Lemma 13, G¯ ∈ cˆ({G¯}), which implies that {F} IS {G¯}.
Since G∗ = G¯∗ by construction, it follows that F  G.
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Now, suppose u(G∗(ω′)) = minx∈X u(x) for at least one ω′. Consider F ′ = 12F +
1
2x
∗
and G′ = 12G +
1
2x
∗ and G¯′ = ¯(G′∗)Q. Now, u(G′∗(ω)) > minx∈X u(x). Apply the above
argument to get {F ′} IS {G′} and (12F + 12x∗)∗ˆ(12G+ 12x∗)∗. Lemma 11 gives that F ∗  G∗,
so F  G. 
Lemma 15. There is a finitely additive probability measure on Σ, pi(·), that assigns positive
probability to every E ∈ P so that for any f, g ∈ F , f  g implies ´ u ◦ fdpi > ´ u ◦ gdpi and
f ∼ g implies ´ u ◦ fdpi = ´ u ◦ gdpi.
Proof. Let F ′ ⊂ F be the acts that are σ(P ) measurable.
Claim 1. For any f ∈ F , there is an f ′ ∈ F ′ so that f ′ ∼ f .
Proof. First, I show that for any act f and any E ∈ P , there is an act g so that g ∼ f
and g is constant on E and agrees with f on Ec. Pick any f ∈ F and any E ∈ P . Let
x¯ = arg maxω∈E u(f(ω)), x = arg minω∈E u(f(ω)), g¯ = x¯Ef and g = xEf . For every
α ∈ [0, 1], define
Bα = {f, αg¯ + (1− α)g}.
By Subjective Consequentialism and because c(B|·) must be P measurable, there is at least
one h in every Bα so that h ∈ c(Bα|ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Fix ω ∈ E. By Monotonicity and INRA,
αg¯ + (1− α)g ∈ c(Bα|ω) & β > α =⇒ βg¯ + (1− β)g ∈ c(Bβ|ω)
and conversely
αg¯ + (1− α)g /∈ c(Bα|ω) & β < α =⇒ βg¯ + (1− β)g /∈ c(Bβ|ω).
Using the above and that g¯ ∈ c(B1|ω), there is an α¯ so that α > α¯ implies that {αg¯ +
(1 − α)g} IS {f} and α < α¯ implies that {f} IS {αg¯ + (1 − α)g} IS {f}. Conclude that
α¯g¯ + (1− α¯)g ∼ f . Since f and E were arbitrary, this establishes the first step.
Now, label P = {E1, ..., En}. Fix f . By the above, there is an f1 so that f ∼ f1 and f1is
constant on E1 and agrees with f on Ec1. For i = 2, ..., n, the above shows that there is fi+1
so that fi ∼ fi+1 and fi+1is constant on Ei+1 and agrees with fi on Eci+1. By construction,
fn is σ(P )-measurable, and f ∼ f1 ∼ f2 ∼ ... ∼ fn =⇒ f ∼ fn by Lemma 7, so fn ∈ F ′
and fn ∼ f , establishing the claim. 
Moreover, F ′ is finite dimensional. Restricted to F ′,  satisfies reflexivity, transitivity
and independence by Lemmas 7 and 4. Lemma 9 implies that if λf + (1− λ)g  g for every
λ ∈ (0, 1), then it is not the case that g  f . Applying Aumann [1962, Thm. A] yields the
existence of a mixture linear U(·) so that f  g implies U(f) > U(g) and f ∼ g implies
U(f) = U(g). By Monotonicity using choice from problems in the set {{xEy, y} : E ∈ P}
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where u(x) > u(y) and Lemma 2, there is a pi(·) with the desired properties, an α > 0 and
a β ∈ R so that U(·) = ´ αu ◦ fdpi(·) + β, the desired result. WLOG, take α = 1 and
β = 0. 
Lemma 16. c(B|ω) = arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|A(B)(ω)).
Proof. Fix B ∈ K(B) and set E = A(B)(ω). First, suppose f ∈ c(B|ω) and set F ∈ cˆ(B) so
that F (ω) = f for all ω ∈ E. Specifically, F  G whenever there is a g ∈ B so that G(ω) =
F (ω) for every ω /∈ E and G(ω) = g for every ω ∈ E, so f ∈ arg maxg∈B
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|E),
implying that c(B|ω) ⊂ arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|E).
Now, suppose that
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|E) ∈ arg maxg∈B
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|E). Set x ∈ X so that
u(x) < min{f(ω):f∈B andω∈Ω} u(f(ω)). Define Fˆ (ω) = F (ω)A(B)(ω)x for all ω and Gˆ(ω) =
F (ω)A(B)(ω)x for all ω /∈ E and Gˆ(ω) = gEx for ω ∈ E and B′ = B ∪ {Fˆ} ∪ {Gˆ}
and note that Subjective Consequentialism and Monotonicity imply Fˆ ∈ cˆ(B′). Then take
B′′ = {Fˆ} ∪ {Gˆ} and by INRA, Fˆ ∈ cˆ(B′′). Now, take y ∈ X so that u(y) > ´ u ◦ fdpi(·|E)
define Bn = (B′′\{gEx}) ∪ { 1ny + n−1n gEx}. By Lemma 15, Gn  F ′ for all F ′ so that
{F ′} ⊂ B where Gn(ω) = Fˆ (ω)A(B)(ω)x for all ω /∈ E and Gn(ω) = 1ny + n−1n gEx for all
ω ∈ E. By Lemma 14, Gn ∈ cˆ(Bn).33
By construction, A(Bn) = A(B′′) for all n. Since 1ny + n−1n g ∈ c(Bn|ω) and ( 1ny +
n−1
n
g)Ex → gEx, it follows from Continuity that gEx ∈ c(B′′|ω). By INRA, c(B′′|ω) =
c(B′|ω) ∩ B′′. Since u ◦ g ≥ u ◦ gEx, gEx ∈ c(B′|ω) =⇒ g ∈ c(B′|ω) by Monotonicity. By
INRA, c(B′|ω) = c(B′|ω) ∩B, so g ∈ c(B|ω), completing the proof. 
Set Pˆ (B) = A(B). Lemma 15 and 14 give that
Pˆ (B) ∈ arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E′∈Q
pi(E ′) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′)
because if F ∈ cˆ(B) then F  G for all G ∈ H and {G} ⊂ B implies that ´ u ◦ F ∗dpi ≥´
u ◦G∗dpi, implying that∑
E′∈Pˆ (B)
pi(E ′)
ˆ
u(F (ω)(ω))dpi(·|E ′) ≥ ∑
E′∈Q
pi(E ′) max
g∈B
ˆ
u ◦ gdpi(·|E ′)
for any Q ∈ P∗. Using that Pˆ (B) = A(B), Lemma 16 gives that c(B|ω) = arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦
fdpi(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)), completing the proof. 
B.1.2. Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Suppose c(·) is represented by (u(·), pi(·),P∗, Pˆ (·)). First, I show that c(·) satisfies
Continuity.
33These inequalities for u(x) and u(y) can be taken to be strict even if u(·) is bounded because the remainder
relies only on properties of R˜. Mixing with B with a constant z ∈ int(u(X)) ensures that there exists such
x, y ∈ X.
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Lemma 17. c(·) satisfies Continuity.
Proof. Suppose that both {f} IS {g} and g weakly dominates f . Let Bn → {f} and Cn →
{g} so that Bn IS Cn. If Bn IS Cn, Fn ∈ c(Bn) and Gn ∈ c(Cn), then
´
u◦F ∗ndpi ≥
´
u◦G∗ndpi.
To see this, let B1, ..., Bn be the sequence from the definition of indirectly selected. Then
Fi ∈ cˆ(Bi) and {Fi+1} ⊂ Bi implies that
´
u ◦ F ∗i dpi ≥
´
u ◦ F ∗i+1dpi by construction of c(·)
for all i. Therefore,
´
u ◦ F ∗ndpi ≥
´
u ◦G∗ndpi.
Now, note that F ∗n → f since all components of Bn → f . Similarly, G∗n → g. There-
fore, since u(·) is continuous, ´ u ◦ fdpi ≥ ´ u ◦ gdpi. Since g weakly dominates f , ´ u ◦
gdpi(·|Pˆ ({f, g})(ω)) ≥ ´ u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ ({f, g})(ω)), without equality for some ω′. This implies
that
´
u ◦ gdpi(·) > ´ u ◦ fdpi, a contradiction. 
For the second part, begin by defining a function V : {Q : P  Q} ×K(F)→ R by
V (Q,B) =
∑
E∈Q
pi(E) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E).
With this formulation, Pˆ (B) ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q,B) for all B. By the maximum theorem,
V (Q, ·) is continuous and arg max V (·, B) is upper-hemi continuous.
If u(·) is constant, then set K = K(F). Both INRA and ACI are satisfied because
c(B|ω) = B for every B and ω. Clearly, K is open and dense in K(F).
If not, then define K by
K = {B ∈ K(F) : ∃Q ∈ P∗ s.t. V (Q,B) > V (Q′, B)∀Q′ ∈ P∗\{Q}}.
I proceed by showing that cl(K) = K(F) and then that K is open.
Lemma 18. cl(K) = K(F)
Proof. Pick any B ∈ K(F) and any  > 0.
Fix x ∈ X so that u(x) ∈ int(u(X)). Define B′ ∈ K(F) by αB + (1 − α){x} for α close
enough to 1 so that d(B′, B) < 3 .
Pick a Q ∈ P∗ so that Q  A(B′) and Q′  Q for Q′ ∈ P∗ implies that Q = Q′. Label
Q = {E1, ..., En} and pick f1, ..., fn so that fi ∈ c(B′|ω) for some ω ∈ Ei. Define f ∗ so that
f ∗(ω) = fi(ω)
whenever ω ∈ Ei and f ∗∗ so that u(f ∗∗) = u(f ∗)+k for some k > 0. Since u◦f ∗ ∈ int(u(X)Ω)
by construction of B′, such a k exists.
Now, define f iα for every α ∈ [0, 1] by f iα = (αfi+(1−α)f ∗∗)Eifi for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}. For
α close enough to 1, d(f iα, fi) < 3 . Therefore, for α
∗ sufficiently high, note that d(B′′, B′) < 3
where
B′′ = B′ ∪ {f iα∗}ni=1.
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Conclude that d(B′′, B) ≤ d(B′′, B′) + d(B′, B) < 23 < . Further, V (Q,B′′) > V (Q′, B′′)
for all Q′ ∈ P∗ so that Q′ 6= Q. Therefore, B′′ ∈ K. Since B and  are arbitrary, there is a
B′′ ∈ K arbitrarily close to any B ∈ K(F). Therefore, cl(K) = K(F). 
Lemma 19. K is open.
Proof. Let Kc = K(F)\K. K is open if and only if Kc is closed. Because K(F) is a metric
space and thus first countable, it is sufficient to only show sequentially closed.
Pick (Bn)∞n=1 ⊂ Kc and suppose that Bn → B. Because P∗ is finite, there are Q 6= Q′ ∈ P∗
and a sub-sequence (Bnk)∞k=1 so that Q,Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q,Bnk) for all Q′′ ∈ P∗. Because
arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q, ·) is upper hemi-continuous and Bnk → B, Q,Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q,B).
Conclude that B ∈ Kc, so Kc is closed and K is open. 
Let > be a linear order on P∗∗ and set
Qˆ(B) = max
>
arg max
Q∈P∗∗
V (Q,B).
Define the conditional choice correspondence c′(·) by
c′(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(B)(ω))
for every B ∈ K(F). Clearly c′(·) has an optimal inattention representation and for every
B ∈ K, c′(B|ω) = c(B|ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.
Lemma 20. c′(·) satisfies ACI.
Proof. IfA(B) A(C), then Qˆ(B) ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,C). Therefore, Qˆ(B) ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,αB+
(1−α)C). Further, ifQ′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,αB+(1−α)C), thenQ′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,B)∩
arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,C). Since Qˆ(B) > Q′ for every Q ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,B), it follows im-
mediately that Qˆ(αB + (1− α)C) = Qˆ(B). The conclusion follows immediately. 
Lemma 21. c′(·) satisfies INRA.
Proof. Suppose that A ⊂ B and c′(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ for all ω. Note that
arg max
Q∈P∗∗
V (Q,A) ⊂ arg max
Q∈P∗∗
V (Q,B)
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and since Qˆ(B) > Q′ for allQ′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,B), Qˆ(B) > Q′ for allQ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,A)
so Qˆ(A) = Qˆ(B). Since
c′(B|ω) ∩ A = [arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(B)(ω))] ∩ A 6= ∅
= arg max
f∈A
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(B)(ω))
= arg max
f∈A
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(A)(ω))
= c′(A|ω)
it follows that c′(B|ω) ∩ A = c′(A|ω). 
Since K is open and cl(K) = K(F), the Theorem follows immediately. 
B.1.3. Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. (iii) clearly implies either (i) or (ii).
[(i) implies (iii)] Suppose c(·) satisfies Independence and has optimal inattention, with
the canonical representation Pˆ (B) = A(B). Let Q be coarsest common refinement of
{Pˆ (B)}B∈K(F). Claim that c(B|ω) = arg maxf∈B
´
u◦fdpi(·|Q(ω)) for every B. If not, there
is a B′ and an ω so that c(B′|ω) 6= arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω)). Since c(·) has inattention,
c(B′|ω) = arg maxf∈B′
´
u◦fdpi(·|Pˆ (B′)(ω)). There is a finite collection {B1, ..., Bn} ⊂ K(F)
so that [∩ni=1Pˆ (Bi)(ω)]∩ Pˆ (B′)(ω) = Q(ω) and c(Bi|ω) 6= c(Bj|ω) for all i 6= j (perhaps after
mixing Bi with a singleton). Set B∗ =
∏n
i=1
1
n
Bi and note that A(B∗)(ω) = Q(ω). Since we
can take Pˆ (B∗) = A(B∗), it follows that
c(B∗|ω) = arg max
f∈B∗
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω)).
Now, since c(12B
∗+ 12B
′|ω) = 12c(B∗|ω)+ 12c(B′|ω), A(12B∗+ 12B′) A(B∗). By construction,
A(12B∗ + 12B′)(ω) = Q(ω), so
c(12B
∗ + 12B
′|ω) = arg max
f∈ 12B∗+ 12B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
= 12 arg maxf∈B∗
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
+12 arg maxf∈B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
6= 12 arg maxf∈B∗
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
+12 arg maxf∈B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ (B′)(ω))
= 12c(B
∗|ω) + 12c(B
′|ω),
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which contradicts Independence.
[(ii) implies (iii)] Suppose that c(·|ω) satisfies WARP and has optimal inattention. Since
K(F) includes all two and three element subsets, there is a complete and transitive binary
relation ω so that This binary relation is equal to the revealed preference relation. Let
Q be any maximal element of P∗ according to . I show that f ∼ω fQ(ω)y for any f
and an arbitrarily bad y. Therefore, Pˆ (B)(ω) ⊂ Q(ω) for every B and ω and consequently
Pˆ (B)(ω) = Q(ω) represents choices.
Fix f ∈ F , ω∗ ∈ Ω and x, y ∈ X so that u(x) > u(f(ω)) > u(y) for every ω ∈ Ω. Define
gω by gω(ω′) = 12x + f(ω) if ω
′ ∈ Q(ω) and gω(ω′) = y otherwise. Consider the problem
B = {gω : ω /∈ Q(ω∗)} ∪ {f, fQ(ω∗)y}. Clearly, Pˆ (B) = Q (otherwise, this is not optimal)
and also f, fQ(ω∗)y ∈ c(B|ω∗). Conclude that f ∼ω fQ(ω∗)y. 
B.1.4. Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. That (ii) implies (i) is trivial, so suppose c(·) has optimal inattention and satisfies
Consequentialism.
Set y, x ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y) and consider B = {xEy : E ∈ P} ∪ {x}. Clearly x ∈
c(B|ω)∀ω. For any ω, note that xP (ω)y ∈ B and xP (ω)y(ω′) = x(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ P (ω).
By Consequentialism, xP (ω)y ∈ c(B|ω). However, if ω′ /∈ P (ω), then monotonicity implies
that xP (ω)y /∈ c(B|ω′). Therefore, A(B) = P , which implies that P ∈ P∗. Since there is no
Q ∈ P∗\{P} finer than P or coarser than P , {P} = P∗, implying that c(·) is Bayesian. 
B.2. Proof from Section 4.
B.2.1. Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. [i,iv]Affine-uniqueness of u(·) is standard, and canonical uniqueness of Pˆ (·) is trivial.
[iii] Suppose P∗1,P∗2 both represent c(·). Since c(·) is non-degenerate, there are x, y ∈ X so
that u(x) > u(y). For any Q ∈ P∗1, define BQ = {xEy : E ∈ Q}. Clearly, xQ(ω)y ∈ c(BQ|ω)
for every ω, so Pˆ (BQ)  Q. Since P∗2 represents c(·), Q ∈ P∗2. Reversing the role of P∗1 and
P∗2 give the converse, so they must be equal. T
[ii] Suppose that both pi1 and pi2 represent c(·). By (iii), let P∗ = P∗1 = P∗2 and P∗∗ =
{Q ∈ P∗ : Q′  Q&Q′ ∈ P∗ =⇒ Q = Q′} be the set of the finest subjective information
partitions in P∗. Write V (B) = arg maxQ∈P∗
∑
E∈Q pi(E)[maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))] for any
B. Let Q be the set of minimal isolatable events for P∗.
Lemma 22. E is a isolatable event for P∗ if and only if any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ are such that
Q1  {E,Ec}, Q2  {E,Ec}, and there is a Q3 ∈ P∗∗ so that
Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}.
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Proof. [ =⇒ ] Suppose that E is an isolatable event for P∗. Then pick any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ and
x, y, z ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y) > u(z) ; let Bi = {xE ′y : E ′ ∈ Qi} for i = 1, 2.
Suppose Qi 6 {E,Ec}. Then ∃F ∈ Q1 s.t. F ∩ E 6= ∅ and F ∩ Ec 6= ∅. Fix z ∈ X
so that u(x′) = u(x) +  where  > 0 and u(y) > u(z). Consider B = Bi and B′ = Bi,
noting that BE,zB′ = BEc,zB′ by construction, and that Qi is the only element of V (B).
If Pˆ (BE,zB′) 6= Qi, then E is not an isolatable event since there is no partition in P∗
finer than Qi except Qi. However, if Pˆ (BEB′) = Qi, then either for any ω ∈ F ∩ E,
[xFy]Ex /∈ c(BE,zB′|ω) or [xFy]Ecz /∈ c(BEc,zB′|ω), implying that xFy /∈ c(BEB′|ω).34
This contradicts that E is an isolatable event for P∗.
Now, consider B = B1 and B′ = B2. By construction, BE,zB′ = B′Ec,zB = B′′. Conse-
quently, [xQ1(ω)y]Ez ∈ c(B′′|ω) for any ω ∈ E and [xQ2(ω)y]Ecz ∈ c(B′′|ω) for any ω ∈ Ec,
implying that Pˆ (B′′)  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}. Therefore, there is
some Q3 ∈ P∗∗ satisfying the desired property.
[⇐=] Suppose that any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ are such that Q1  {E,Ec}, Q2  {E,Ec}, and
there is a Q3 ∈ P∗∗ so that
Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}.
Consider any B so that V (B) is singleton, and pick any B′, labeling Pˆ (B) = Q1 and
Pˆ (B′) = Q. If there is no z so that z /∈ c({f(ω), z}|ω) for any f ∈ B∪B′, then the condition
is arbitrarily satisfied so suppose such a z exists and consider BE,zB′.
I claim that
{Q1} = arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E′∈Q&E′⊂E
pi(E ′) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′).
Suppose not, so Q′ 6= Q1 is in the argmax above. Q′′ = {E ′ ∩E : E ′ ∈ Q′} ∪ {E ′ ∩Ec : E ′ ∈
Q1} gives at least as high utility as Q1 when facing, and by assumption, there is a Q∗ ∈ P∗∗
so that Q∗  Q′′, contradicting that V (B) is a singleton.
Consider now BE,zB′. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that Pˆ (BE,zB′) cannot be
written as {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E}∪{E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec} for some Q2 ∈ P∗. Let Pˆ (BE,zB′) = Q′
and take any Q  Q′ so that Q ∈ P∗∗. There is a Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q :
E ′ ⊂ Ec} that is in P∗∗. Further,∑
E′∈Q3&E′⊂Ec
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′) ≥ ∑
E′∈Q′&E′⊂Ec
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′)
because Q3 is finer than Q′ when restricted to Ec, and∑
E′∈Q3&E′⊂E
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′) ≥ ∑
E′∈Q′&E′⊂E
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′)
34This procedure must be modified slightly when pi1(F ∩E) = pi1(F ∩Ec) so that the bet on F gives slightly
higher utility on F ∩ Ec, but arguments otherwise extend.
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by the above claim because for any E ′ ⊂ E,
max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′) ≤ max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′),
where equality holds whenever E ′ ∈ Q1. But this contradicts the assumption that V (B) is
a singleton: since {E ′ ∈ Q3 : E ′ ⊂ E} 6= {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E}, there is a Q4  {E ′ ∈ Q3 :
E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}, Q4 6= Q1 and Q4 ∈ V (B) by construction. Conclude that
Pˆ (BE,zB′) = {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q : E ′ ⊂ Ec} for some Q ∈ P∗.
Now, fix any ω ∈ E and suppose f ∈ c(B|ω). Since c(B|ω) = arg maxg∈B
´
u◦gdpi(·|Q1(ω))
and c(BE,zB′|ω) = arg maxf∈BE,zB′
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|Q1(ω)) and
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q1(ω)) =
´
u ◦
fEzdpi(·|Q1(ω)), it follows that fEz ∈ c(B|ω). Similar arguments show that the same
property holds for Ec. Conclude that E is an isolatable event for P∗. 
This implies that Q P .
Lemma 23. If E is an isolatable event for P∗and F is a isolatable event P∗, then E ∩ F is
an isolatable event P∗.
Proof. Suppose E and F and isolatable events. Fix any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗. Since E is an isolatable
event, there is a Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec} ∈ P∗∗. Since Q2, Q3 ∈ P∗∗
and F is an isolatable event, there is a Q4  {E ′ ∈ Q3 : E ′ ⊂ F} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ F c} ∈
P∗∗. By construction, Q4  {Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E ∩ F} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ (E ∩ F )c}. Since Q1, Q2
were arbitrary, this holds for any Q1, Q2. By Lemma 22, E ∩ F is a sub-problem. 
Lemma 24. If Q ∈ P∗∗ and E ∈ Q, then pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E).
Proof. Take any Q ∈ P∗∗ and any E ∈ Q. Set x, y ∈ int(u(X)) so that u(x) > u(y). WLOG,
identify x = u(x) and y = u(y). Set  so that
pi1(E)2+ (y − x)pi1(E ′) < 0
for all E ′ ∈ P . Take any simple f, g ∈ RE so that ´ fdpi1(·|E) ≥ ´ gdpi1(·|E). There
is an α ∈ (0, 1] so that αf + (1 − α)x, αg + (1 − α)x ∈ [x − , x + ]. There are acts
f ′, g′ ∈ F so that u(f ′)(ω) = αf(ω) + (1 − α)x for all ω ∈ E and u(f ′)(ω) = x otherwise
and u(g′)(ω) = αg(ω) + (1 − α)x for all ω ∈ E and u(g′)(ω) = x otherwise. Define B =
{f ′Q(ω)y : ω ∈ Ω} ∪ {g′Q(ω)y : ω ∈ Ω}.
Claim that Pˆ (B) = Q. If not, then there is a Q′ so that Pˆ (B) = Q′, so let H ∈ cˆ(B) and
consider H∗. It must be that
´
H∗dpi1 ≥
´
fdpi1. Since Q′ is not finer than Q, there must
be some E ′ ∈ P so that H∗(ω) = y for all ω ∈ E ′. Let E ′′ = {ω ∈ Ω : u(H∗(ω)) ≥ u(f(ω))}.
By construction, E ′′ ⊂ E. Further, 2 ≥ u(H∗(ω)) − u(f(ω)). Therefore pi1(E)2 + (y −
x)pi1(E ′)+
´
u◦f ′dpi1 ≥
´
H∗dpi1. However,
´
u◦f ′dpi1 > pi1(E)2+(y−x)pi1(E ′)+
´
u◦f ′dpi1,
contradicting that Pˆ (B) = Q′.
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Since
´
fdpi1(·|E) ≥
´
gdpi1(·|E), f ′Q(ω)x ∈ c(B|ω). Since pi2(·) also represents c(·),´
fdpi2(·|E) ≥
´
gdpi2(·|E). Since f and g are arbitrary,
´
fdpi1(·|E) ≥
´
gdpi1(·|E) ⇐⇒´
fdpi2(·|E) ≥
´
gdpi2(·|E) for any f and g. Therefore, pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E) for every E. 
Lemma 25. If pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E), pi1(·|E ′) = pi2(·|E ′) and E ∩ E ′ 6= ∅ then pi1(·|E ∪ E ′) =
pi2(·|E ∪ E ′).
Proof. Suppose that pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E), pi1(·|E ′) = pi2(·|E ′) and E ∩ E ′ 6= ∅. Note that
pi1(F |E) = pi2(F |E) and pi1(F |E ′) = pi2(F |E ′). Using Bayes’ rule on the event E ∩ E ′, it
follows that
pi1(E|E ∪ E ′)
pi1(E ′|E ∪ E ′) =
pi2(E|E ∪ E ′)
pi2(E ′|E ∪ E ′) .
For any F ∈ Σ, it holds that
pi1(F |E ∪ E ′) = pi1(E|E ∪ E ′)(pi1(F |E)− pi1(F ∩ E ′|E)) + pi1(E ′|E ∪ E ′)pi1(F |E ′)
and that
pi2(F |E ∪ E ′) = pi2(E|E ∪ E ′)(pi2(F |E)− pi2(F ∩ E ′|E)) + pi2(E ′|E ∪ E ′)pi2(F |E ′).
Because pi1(E ∪E ′|E ∪E ′) = pi2(E ∪E ′|E ∪E ′) = 1, conclude that pi2(·|E ∪E ′) = pi1(·|E ∪
E ′). 
Let Q∗ be the finest common coarsening of P∗∗. By successive applications of Lemma 25,
we have that pi1(·|E ′) = pi2(·|E ′) for all E ′ ∈ Q∗.
Lemma 26. For any E ∈ Q, pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E).
Proof. To save on notation, write pi1 = pi1(·|E) and pi2 = pi2(·|E) and assume it is understood
that each event E ′ is contained in E. Label the events in Q∗ that are contained in E as
E1, E2, ..., En. If n = 1, then we are done by the above, so assume n ≥ 2.
Consider E1 and E2. By construction, there must be Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ so that E ′ ⊂ E1 is in
Q1 but not Q2, E ′′ ⊂ E2 is in Q2 but not in Q1, and there is no Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂
E1} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec1}. Fix x, y ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y) and u(x), u(y) ∈ int(u(X)).
Define B1 = {xFy : F ∈ Q1} and B2 = {xFy : F ∈ Q2}. Let B1 = (B1 ∪ {x′E ′y})\{xE ′y}
and B2 = (B1∪{x′E ′′y})\{xE ′′y} where u(x′) = u(x)+. For , ′ small enough but positive,
Pˆ (B1 ∪B
′
2 ) =
Q1 if pi1(E
′) > ′pi1(E ′′)
Q2 if pi1(E ′) < ′pi1(E ′′).
Therefore, there exists a k = pi1(E′′)
pi1(E′) so that

′ > k implies Pˆ (B

1 ∪ B′2 ) = Q1 and ′ < k
implies Pˆ (B1 ∪ B′2 ) = Q1. Since pi2 also represents c(·), the same cutoff must hold for pi2.
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Therefore,
pi2(E ′′)
pi2(E ′)
= pi1(E
′′)
pi1(E ′)
.
By Lemma 25 and Bayes rule,
pi2(E1)
pi2(E2)
= pi1(E1)
pi1(E2)
.
By replacing E1 with Ei and E2 with Ei+1, we must have pi2(Ei)pi2(Ei+1) =
pi1(Ei)
pi1(Ei+1) . Since∑n
i=1 pi1(Ei) =
∑n
i=1 pi2(Ei) = 1, we must have that pi1(Ei) = pi2(Ei) for all i. 
Conclude that pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E) whenever E is a minimal isolatable event for P∗1, estab-
lishing the result. 
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Fix a pi1 that represents c(·). It suffices to show that any pi so that pi(·|E) = pi1(·|E)
for every E ∈ Q also represents c(·). Fix any such pi. It’s clear that pi(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)) =
pi1(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)) for all ω because Pˆ (B) Q. By Lemma 22,
arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))] = arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi1(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi1(·|Q(ω))]
for every B. Conclude that pi(·) also represents c(·). 
B.3. Proofs from Section 5. Assume P is finite and label P = {P1, ..., Pn}. Write AISP B
if AIS B for cP (·).
Axiom. (Agreement) If {f} ISP {g} and not {g} ISP {f}, then for any α1, ..., αn ∈ [0, 1]
and acts f1, ..., fn, g1, ..., gn so that
∑
αi = 1 and {gi} ISPi {fi}, either
∑
αigi 6= g or∑
αifi 6= f .
Theorem 6. If P is finite, each c ∈ {cP (·)}P∈P has an optimal inattention representation
and {cP (·)}P∈P satisfies Agreement, then there is a pi(·) and a u(·) so that each cQ(·) is
represented by (u, pi, Qˆ(·),P∗Q).
Proof. Define P on F by f P g if and only if {f} ISP {g}. P is a preorder that satisfies
Gilboa et al. [2010]’s c-completeness, monotonicity and independence by Lemmas 7, 8, 10,
and 11 respectively. Let B0 be the set of simple, Σ-measurable, real functions. There exists
a uP : X → R by Lemma 2. By agreement, it is WLOG to take the same u(·) for uP (·) and
assume that 0 ∈ int(u(X)). For every P , define a cone KP ⊂ B0 by
KP = {λ(u ◦ f − u ◦ g) : f P g and λ ∈ R+}
and let K = co(∪P∈PKP ). K is a cone: suppose v ∈ K. Then there are γi and vi ∈ Ki so
that ∑ γivi = v. But then λvi ∈ Ki and consequently ∑ γiλvi = λv and λv ∈ K.
FOUNDATIONS FOR OPTIMAL INATTENTION 43
Note that Agreement implies that if there exist f1, ..., fn, g1, ..., gn ∈ F and α1, ..., αn ∈
[0, 1] so that ∑αi = 1, fi Pi gi, f = ∑αifi and g = ∑αigi, then g 6P f for any P ∈ P .
Identify fˆ with u ◦ f ∈ B0. Define  by f  g if and only if fˆ − gˆ ∈ K. Claim that 
extends each P compatibly. First, note that if f P g, then fˆ − gˆ ∈ KP ⊂ K, so f  g.
Suppose g Pi f but f  g, so that fˆ − gˆ = v ∈ K. Then there are v1, ..., vn so that
vi ∈ KPi and γ1, ...γn ∈ R+ so that ∑
γivi = v.
Consequently, there is a λi and two acts fi, gi so that fi Pi gi and λi(fˆi−gˆi) = vi. Rewriting,
fˆ − gˆ = ∑λiγifˆi −∑λiγigˆi
so defining h(ω) = ∑λiγifˆi(ω)− fˆ(ω) = ∑λiγigˆi(ω)− gˆ(ω) gives that
fˆ + h =
∑
λiγifˆi
and
gˆ + h =
∑
λiγigˆi.
Moreover, by mixing f, g, fi, gi with an act 0 so that u(0(ω)) = 0 in every state at a given
probability, we can take h ∈ u(X)Ω. Now, we have that 12f + 12h =
∑
λiγi(12fi +
1
20) and
1
2g+
1
2h =
∑
λiγi(12gi+
1
20). Conclude that there are acts f
′
i = 12fi+
1
20 and g
′
i = 12gi+
1
20 and
αi ∈ [0, 1] so that f ′i Pi g′i for every i and that 12f + 12h =
∑
αif
′
i and 12g+
1
2h =
∑
αig
′
i. By
Agreement, it is not the case that 12g+
1
2h Pi 12f + 12h. However g Pi f ⇐⇒ 12g+ 12h Pi
1
2f +
1
2h because Pi satisfies Independence, a contradiction.
Now,  has an Aumann utility for the same reasons as above. Further, it also satisfies
Independence, monotonicity, reflexivity, transitivity and continuity from Gilboa et al. [2010].
Conclude from their Theorem 1 that  has a unique set of priors Π so that f  g ⇐⇒´
u ◦ fdpi ≥ ´ u ◦ gdpi for all pi ∈ Π. The prior from the Aumann utility must be in Π by
routine arguments. 
B.3.1. Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. First, suppose that c(·) is more attentive than c′(·). Fix an arbitrary Q ∈ P∗c′ and
x, y ∈ X so that uc′(x) > uc′(y). Define the problem B by {xEy : E ∈ Q}. By construction,
Pˆc′(B) Q so ˆˆPc′(B) = Q. It follows from c(·) more attentive than c′(·) that there exists a
B′ so that ˆˆPc(B′) = Q. Consequently, Pˆc(B′) ∈ P∗c and Pˆc(B′) ˆˆPc(B′) = Q so Q ∈ P∗c .
Now, suppose that P∗c′ ⊂ P∗c . Fix an arbitrary B and suppose that ˆˆPc′(B) = Q. It follows
immediately that Q ∈ P∗c′ . Fix x, y ∈ X so that uc(x) > uc(y). Define the problem B′
by {xEy : E ∈ Q}. By construction, Pˆc(B′)  Q , implying that ˆˆPc(B′) = Q. Since B
is arbitrary, there exists such a B′ for every B. It follows that c(·) is more attentive than
c′(·). 
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B.3.2. Proof of Theorem 5:
Proof. It is clear that P∗Q ⊂ P∗P implies that that P is more valuable than Q. From Theorem
4, this follows from cP (·) has a higher capacity for attention than cQ(·).
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that P is not more valuable than Q but that cP (·)
does not have a higher capacity for attention than cQ(·). Then there must be some u, pi,
B ∈ K(F) so that
max
Q′∈P∗Q
V (u, pi,B,Q′) > max
Q′′∈P∗P
V (u, pi,B,Q′′).
Let Q∗ ∈ arg maxQ′∈P∗Q V (u, pi,B,Q′). From Theorem 4, P∗Q ⊂ P∗P , so Q∗ ∈ P∗P . Therefore,
max
Q′′∈P∗P
V (u, pi,B,Q′′) ≥ V (u, pi,B,Q∗) = max
Q′∈P∗Q
V (u, pi,B,Q′),
a contradiction. 
B.4. Proofs from Section 6.
B.4.1. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Let p be an equilibrium to the market φ where there is at least one firm of each type.
For i = 1, ...,m, let pi = min{pj : φj = i} where min(∅) = ∞. Relabel so that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ...
and suppose that pi ≤ 1 for i ≤ κ (this is WLOG because no firm of type i sells anything
if pi > 0). I claim that pκ−1 = 0. By assumption, there is at least one firm, j∗, so that
φj∗ = κ+ 1.
Suppose pκ−1 > 0. If the consumer purchases a good of type i, she purchases from the
firm that charges pi by monotonicity. If she pays attention to the partition
(6) {{1}, {2}, ..., {κ, κ+ 1, ...,m}},
then her expected utility is
κ−1∑
i=1
1
m
(1− pi)
which is a maximum, unless 1
m
(1− pκ) ≥ p1(m− κ), in which case
(7) {{1}, {2}, {3}, ..., {κ}, {j, κ+ 1, ...m}}\{j}
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ κ so that pj = p1 attains an expected utility of
κ∑
i=1
1
m
(1− pi)− (m− κ)p1.
In either case, firm j∗ makes zero profit.
Suppose j∗ deviates to charging a price pκ−12 > 0. Now, the optimal partition is either
{{1}, {2}, ..., {κ+ 1}, {κ− 1, κ, κ+ 2, ...,m}}
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if (6) was maximal in the first problem or
{{1}, {2}, {3}, ..., {κ− 1}, {κ+ 1}, {j, κ, κ+ 2, ...,m}}\{j}
for j as above if (7) was maximal in the first problem. In state κ+1, the consumer purchases
from j∗ so it attains an expected profit of
pκ−1
2m > 0
which is a profitable deviation and contradicts that p is an equilibrium where pκ−1 > 0.
Therefore, pκ−1 = 0 in any equilibrium.
Since p1 = 0, the second partition is always optimal. Suppose 1 ≥ pκ > 0, so the consumer
purchases from a firm of type κ and pays a positive price in state κ in the equilibrium. Firm
j∗can charge pκ2 and attract customers to make positive profit. Therefore, pκ = 0 so κ firms
of different types charge price 0 in equilibrium and the consumer purchases from one of these
firms no matter what the state is. 
B.4.2. Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Expected total surplus is equal to the probability that the consumer purchases the
good from a firm whose type matches the state. Clearly, this probability can be no larger
than nm(φ)+nc(φ)
m
. Further, the consumer makes at most κ different purchases, so it can also
be no larger than κ
m
. If k ≥ nm(φ) + nc(φ) but the consumer makes less than nm(φ) + nc(φ)
different purchases or nm(φ) + nc(φ) > κ and the consumer makes less than κ, then a firm
from which the consumer does not purchase can make positive profit by charging a price equal
to  > 0 for  small enough. Consequently, in equilibrium, the consumer purchases the good
from a firm whose type matches the state with probability equal to max{nm(φ)+nc(φ)
m
, κ
m
}.
For expected consumer surplus, if κ < nm(φ)+nc(φ), the result follows from Proposition 2
and the above discussion. If κ ≥ nm(φ) +nc(φ), then it is easy to verify that in equilibrium,
the monopolistic firms charge price 1 and at least one competitive firm of each type charges
price 0. Consequently, expected consumer surplus equals nc(φ)
m
. 
Appendix C. Counter-Examples
For the following, set Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, P = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}} and X = ∆R. To econo-
mize on space, I write (a, b, c) for an act that gives a for sure in state ω1, b for sure in state
ω2 and c for sure in state ω3 and c(B|·) = (c(B|ω1), c(B|ω2), c(B|ω3)).
C.1. All but ACI. Suppose P∗ = {Q P : #Q ≤ 2}, u(x) = x and pi(ω) = 13 for every ω.
Define a cost function ρ so that ρ(Q) = #Q− 1 if Q ∈ P∗ and ρ(Q) =∞ otherwise. If
Pˆ (B) = max
>
arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))]− ρ(Q)
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where {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}} > {{ω2}, {ω1, ω3}} > {{ω3}, {ω1, ω2}} > {Ω} and Equation (2)
holds, then c(·) violates ACI but satisfies the other 4 axioms. Define f, g, h by (2, 0, 0),
(0, 2, 2) and (0, 0, 0), respectively, and let Bα = α{f, g} + (1 − α){h}. Note that c(B1|·) =
({f}, {g}, {g}). For α ≥ 12 , Pˆ (Bα) = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}, but for α < 12 Pˆ (Bα) = {Ω}.
Therefore,
c(B 1
4
|ω1) = {14g +
3
4h} 6= {
1
4f +
3
4h} =
1
4c(B1|ω1) +
3
4{h},
contradicting ACI.35 Monotonicity and Subjective Consequentialism are clearly satisfied. To
see that INRA is satisfied, note that by Equation (2), if A ⊂ B and A ∩ c(B|ω) 6= ∅ for all
ω, then Pˆ (A) = Pˆ (B). Again using equation (2), we have that c(A|ω) = c(B|ω) ∩ A.
C.2. All but INRA. Keeping P∗, u(·), pi(·) and > as above, suppose that
Pˆ (B) = max
>
arg min
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[min
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))]
for every B and that Equation (2) holds for each B and ω. This c(·) violates INRA. Take
f, g, h, j so that f = (3, 1, 2), g = (1, 3, 1), h = (1, 0, 0) and j = (0, 1, 1). If B = {f, g, h, j}
and A = {f, g}, then Pˆ (B) = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}} while Pˆ (A) = {{ω2}, {ω1, ω3}}. Conse-
quently, c(B|·) = ({f}, {g}, {g}) and c(A|·) = ({f}, {g}, {f}), contradicting INRA.36 Equa-
tion (2) implies that Subjective Consequentialism and Monotonicity hold. To see why ACI
holds, note that
min
f∈αB+(1−α){g}
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E) = αmin
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E) + (1− α)
ˆ
u ◦ gdpi(·|E)
for any B, g and E. This implies that Pˆ (αB + (1− α){g}) = Pˆ (B), and Equation (2) gives
that ACI holds.
C.3. All but Monotonicity. Let v(x, ω1) = x and v(x, ω2) = v(x, ω3) = −x. Define
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
∑
ω∈Ω
v(f(ω), ω)
and note that 0 ∈ c({0, 1}|ω) for all ω. Set f = (1, 0, 0) andB = {f, 0}. Since∑ω∈Ω v(f(ω), ω) =
1 and ∑ω∈Ω v(0, ω) = 0, {f} = c(B|ω). However, 0 ∈ c({0, f(ω)}|ω) for all ω, so Monotonic-
ity is contradicted. It is trivial to verify that the other axioms are satisfied.
C.4. All but Subjective Consequentialism. Return to the setup from the first two
counter-examples. Set pi1(ω1) = pi2(ω3) = 12 , pi1(ω2) = pi1(ω3) = pi2(ω1) = pi2(ω2) =
1
4 ,
and pi3 = pi2. Suppose that
c(B|ωi) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpii
35Similar choices occur for any B′ with d(B′, B) <  for  suitably small.
36Similar choices occur for any B′ with d(B′, B) <  for  suitably small.
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and consider f = (4, 2, 2), g = (4, 2, 0), h = (0, 4, 5) and B = {f, g, h}. By construction
c(B|·) = ({f}, {h}, {h}). Note that {ω1} = {ω′′ : c(B|ω′′) = c(B|ω1)} and that f(ω1) =
g(ω1), a contradiction of subjective consequentialism. The other properties are trivial to
verify.
C.5. All but Continuity. Take P∗, u(·) and pi(·) as in the first example. Write Pi =
{{ωi}, {ωi}c}. For every problem B, define an ordering >B by Pi >B Pj if and only if
max
f∈B
u(f(ωi))) > max
f∈B
u(f(ωj))OR
[max
f∈B
u(f(ωi))) = max
f∈B
u(f(ωj))AND max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωi}c) > max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωj}c)]
OR [max
f∈B
u(f(ωi))) = max
f∈B
u(f(ωj))AND max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωi}c) = max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωj}c)
AND i < j]
Also, set every Pi >B {Ω}. For every problem B, take Pˆ (B) = max>B P∗ and suppose
Equation (2) holds. I will show that Continuity fails. Set f = (1, .9., 1). and g = (1, .8, 1),
noting that f dominates g but g does not dominate f . Set h = (1, 0, 1), j = (0, .9, 0) and
k = (0, 0, 0), and for every n > 2 define Bn,1 = {g}, Bn,2 = {g, n−1n h + 1nk, n−1n j + 1nk},
Bn,3 = {n−1n h+ 1nk, n−1n j + 1nk, n−2n f + 2nk}, Bn,4{, n−2n f + 2nk}. Note that
({g}, {g}, {g}) = c(Bn,2|·),
that
({n− 1
n
h+ 1
n
k}, {n− 1
n
j + 1
n
k}, {n− 1
n
h+ 1
n
k}) = c(Bn,3|·),
and that
({n− 2
n
f + 2
n
k}, {n− 2
n
f + 2
n
k}, {n− 2
n
f + 2
n
k}) = c({n− 2
n
f + 2
n
k}|·).
Therefore {g} IS {n−2
n
f + 2
n
k} for every n > 2, and as n → ∞, n−2
n
f + 2
n
k → f . Conclude
that {g} IS {f} and f dominates g but g does not dominate f , contradicting Continuity.
One can verify easily that the other four axioms are satisfied.
C.6. Behavior compatible with optimal inattention but not inattention to alter-
natives. Suppose Ω = {a, b, c, d} and P = {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}}. Consider pi so that pi(ω) = 14
for every ω and P∗ = {Q : Q  Q1} ∪ {Q : Q  Q2} where Q1 = {{a}, {b, c}, {d}} and
Q2 = {{a, d}, {b}, {c}}. Define acts x, y, z, w that give the utility values in the following
table:
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a b c d
u ◦ w 6 6 6 4
u ◦ x 8 9 0 0
u ◦ y 0 0 0 16
u ◦ z 2 0 9 0
One can verify that Pˆ ({x, y, z, w}) = Q1, Pˆ ({x, z, w}) = Q2, Pˆ ({x, y, z}) = Q2, and
Pˆ ({y, z}) = Q1, so c({x, y, z, w}|a) = {x}, c({x, z, w}|a) = {w}, c({x, y, z}|a) = {y}, and
c({y, z}) = {z}. But then by Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 of Masatlioglu et al. [2012], xPy and
yPx so c(·|a) cannot be a choice with limited attention.
C.7. Behavior compatible with inattention to alternatives but not optimal inat-
tention. Use the same setup as in C.6. Fix x, y, z ∈ X, i.e. all three are lotteries. Suppose
c(·|a) is a choice with limited attention where Γ({x, y, z}) = {y, z}, Γ({x, y}) = {x, y} and
x  y  z. Then c({x, y, z}|a) = {y} and c({x, y}|a) = {x}. If c(·) has an optimal inat-
tention representation, then c({x, y, z}|a) = {y} implies u(y) > u(x) but c({x, y}|a) = {x}
implies u(x) > u(y), a contradiction.
